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She argues she suffered particularized harm because she was denied the right to vote on whether to adopt the Guidelines, relying on Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, ¶ 9 (2011).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, [and] consider[] the context.” ¶ 11 (2019); see also Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, ¶ 34 (2011) (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context.” see also Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appts., (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Uni

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, [and] consider[] the context.” ¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 34 (2011) (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))).

See Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, ¶ 34 (2011) (noting that constitutional language must be interpreted in context).

v. Hegyi, ¶ 6 (2014) (explaining that, when interpreting a statute, the words “cannot be read in isolation from the context in which they are used”) (citing Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, ¶ 34 (2011)).

¶ 34 (2011) (recognizing that words in constitution must be interpreted in context).

See Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, ¶ 34

Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, ¶ 34, (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))).

See Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, ¶ 34, see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”).

See Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, ¶ 34 , (statutory terms must be considered in context).

See Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, ¶ 34

e Rios, 172 Ariz. at 5, 833 P.2d at 22 (“In limited circumstances, a judicial proceeding by way of special action may be appropriate to test the constitutionality of executive conduct.”); see also Adams v. Comm'n on Appellate Court 9 Appointments, ¶ 9, ¶ 8

See Adams v. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appointments, , 136 ¶ 34, (citing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 , 113 S.Ct.