Cited by

Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., –58, ¶ 10 (2012).

Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶¶ 9–10 (2012).

See Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 15 (2012) (“The concept of ‘scope of employment,’ when used in the tort context, is tied to the employer’s right to control the employee’s activity at the time of the tortious conduct.”).

See Restatement (Third) of Agency (“Restatement”) §§ 7.04, 7.07 (2006); see also Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 17 (App. 2011), aff’d, ¶ 13 (2012) (adopting the Restatement).

of Ariz., Inc., ¶ 9 (2018) (quoting Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012)).

See Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 17 (App. 2011), aff’d, (observing that to be liable for an employee’s negligence, an employer must be subject to the employer’s control or right of control).

See Kopp, 244 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 9 (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for ‘the negligent work-related actions of its employees.’” (quoting Engler v. Gulf Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012))); Tarron v. Bowen Mach.

The superior court found, and we agree, that Towers “did not allege any facts about Ingram’s employment with Toyvan Support Group or how posting on an unrelated webpage was in the course and scope of the putative employment.” See Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012) (stating the general rule that an employer can be held vicariously liable for an employee’s torts if the employee is acting “within the scope of employment when the accident occurs”) (citation and internal quotation mark

See Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012) (employer vicariously liable for employee’s torts committed within the course and scope of employment); Wiper v. Downtown Dev.

¶13 Citing Arizona authority, Gillis correctly argues that an employer like Sandbar may be held liable for the negligent acts of its employees “under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” See Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012).

Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012).

¶8 “For an employer to be held vicariously liable for an employee’s negligent acts, the employee must be (1) subject to the employer’s control or right of control, and (2) acting in furtherance of the employer’s business.” Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 17 (App. 2011), aff’d, ¶ 21 (2012).

Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, ¶ 15 (2012) ( and Grammatico, 211 Ariz. at 72, ¶ 23); accord English v. Indus.

Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng'g, Inc. , , 57 ¶ 9, , 601 (2012).

¶9 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for “the negligent work-related actions of its employees.” Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012).

Udy, 162 Ariz. at 9–10; see also Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 9 (2012) (noting that an employer/landowner is vicariously liable for off-premises injuries caused by the negligence of its employee); Wickham, 226 Ariz. at 471, 472 ¶¶ 11, 17– 18 (discussing duty owed by landowners to business invitees for off- premises injuries); Stephens, 186 Ariz. at 430–31 (holding that a l

See Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 15 , (noting that the Workers’ Compensation Act contemplates a liberal interpretation of the employment relationship, and thus the reasoning underlying workers’ compensation cases does not apply to vicarious liability in tort cases); see also Throop v. F.E.

Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., ¶ 8