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§ 13-4033(B) “bars a defendant from directly appealing a contested post-judgment restitution order,” instead requiring such a challenge to be made in “post- conviction relief proceedings.” ¶ 1, 366 ¶ 19 (2013); see Ariz. R. Crim.

County of Pima, –63, ¶ 1 (2013).

Accordingly, we “strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.” ¶ 7 (2013) (quotation and citation omitted).

County of Pima, –63, 366, ¶¶ 1, 19 (2013) (no jurisdiction under A.R.S.

of Pima, our supreme court considered whether a post-judgment restitution order entered after the defendant pleaded guilty was appealable under § 13- 4033(A)(3) (appeal of post-judgment order affecting the defendant’s substantial rights) or subject to § 13-4033(B)’s limitation on direct appeal.

County of Pima, ¶ 17 (2013) (noting that restitution was entered pursuant to a plea agreement even when the defendant contested the amount of restitution).

“[W]e must ‘strive to construe 3 STATE V. GREEN Opinion of the Court a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.’” ¶ 7 (2013) ().

County of Pima, ¶ 19 (2013), in which the supreme court held that a Rule 32 proceeding is the only vehicle available for challenging a contested restitution order "entered pursuant to a plea agreement that contemplated payment of restitution and capped the amount."

of Pima, ¶¶ 7, 16 (2013) (noting a restitution order imposed after a trial is a post-judgment order affecting the defendant’s substantial rights).

of Pima, ¶ 19 (2013), and Hobbs offers no persuasive explanation why he may bring a backhanded challenge in probate court.

(observing § 13-805 enacted “to assist victims in obtaining prompt restitution”) (emphasis omitted), Pinto, 179 Ariz. at 596, 880 P.2d at 1142 (same); see also A.R.S.