Cited by

¶ 16 (2016) (citing Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ.

¶ 16 (2016) (citations omitted).

¶7 “[W]e accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them,” ¶ 9 (2016), and will only overturn the court’s finding of sufficient evidence supporting a statutory factor if “no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing,” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, -79, ¶ 31 (2023) (quotation omitted); A.R.

See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149 ¶ 8 ( ¶ 15 (2016)); see also Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 12 (2020).

at 148, 150–51, ¶¶ 1, 13; – 4, ¶ 12 (2016).

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” “Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility,” we must accept its factual findings if they are supported by “reasonable evidence and inferences.” ¶ 9 (2016).

at 148, 150–51, ¶¶ 1, 13; –4, ¶ 12 (2016).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 We view and recount the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s order, ¶ 2 (2016), and use pseudonyms to protect the daughters’ identities, see Ariz. R. Sup.

¶ 15 (2016) (citation omitted).

(“Framed in the disjunctive, this standard permits a finding of best interests based on either a benefit to the child from severance or some harm to the child if severance is denied.”).

-5 ¶¶ 16-17 (2016) (holding adoption can support a finding termination is in the best interests of a child).

In determining a child’s best interests, a court must consider “the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 1 (2018), including whether the child’s needs are currently being met, the child’s “interest in stability and security,” -4, ¶¶ 12, 15 (2016) (quotation omitted), and the parent’s “rehabilitation efforts,” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15.

Decision of the Court be affirmed “if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” -7 ¶¶ 2, 9, 22 (2016).

¶ 15 (2016) (citing cases).

“When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a [superior] court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” ¶ 12 (2016).

¶25 As the trier of fact, “the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility,” therefore, “we accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.” ¶ 9 (2016).

¶16 Once a parent is found unfit, “the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” ¶ 15 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 35).