Cited by

at 151, ¶¶ 14- 15; -4, ¶ 12 (2016).

But we will not re-weigh the evidence on appeal, ¶ 9 (2016), and the juvenile court’s written findings about statutory grounds are legally sufficient and supported by evidence in the record.

¶ 9 (2016) (The superior court “is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility.”).

¶ 2 (2016); Michelle M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, n.2 (App. 2017) (citing Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

“Framed in the disjunctive, this standard permits a finding of best interests based on either a benefit to the child from severance or some harm to the child if severance is denied.” ¶ 16.

Decision of the Court possible and likely, [the superior] court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” ¶ 12 (2016).

Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests inquiry is “protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” ¶ 15 (2016) ( ¶ 35 (2005)).

“It is well established in state-initiated cases that the child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13 (2018) ( ¶ 15 (2016)).

Conversely, the court may find that a child would be harmed by the continuation of the parent-child relationship if it would cause “negative and psychologically harmful interactions” with the child, ¶ 21 (2016), or if a parent’s unfitness remains unremedied and “detrimentally affects the child’s well-being,” Pima Cnty.

We “accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them,” ¶ 9 (2016), and we will affirm the court’s legal 4 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.W.

See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶ 13; ¶ 14 (2016) (“Of course, a court need not automatically conclude that severance is in a child’s best interests just because the child is adoptable; there may be other circumstances indicating that severance is not the best option.”).