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Thus, we will “accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9 (2016).

The superior court “is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility.” ¶ 9 (2016).

¶13 “When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” ¶ 12 (2016); see also Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 22 (App. 2018) (“Thus, while courts have often referred to a child’s ‘adoptability’ or her ‘adoptive placement’ in determining best interests, we conclude those findings, to be meaning

¶22 “[W]e accept the [superior] court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9 (2016) (citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 20).

“When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a [superior] court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” ¶ 12 (2016) (citation omitted).

Consequently, at this stage, “the court must balance this diluted parental interest against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.” Id.; ¶ 15 (2016).

¶31 “[W]e accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” ¶ 9 (2016) (citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 20).

¶ 15 (2016) (stating children’s interests in stability and security are the court’s primary concern) (emphasis added).

§ 14-2114(B); ¶ 17 (2016).