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2 STATE v. AGUIRRE Opinion of the Court laws,” City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc., ¶¶ 16, 17 (2017), the superior court got it right.

See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶ 12 (2017).

¶40 That is the most natural way to read the last sentence’s introductory phrase—“[n]otwithstanding any other law.” See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶ 16 (2017) (The “introductory phrase, ‘[n]otwithstanding any other statute,’ makes clear that the statute of repose controls over other, potentially conflicting state laws.”(emphasis added)).

¶ 13 (App. 2023) (statute’s use of phrase “notwithstanding any other law” controls over any otherwise conflicting law); City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶ 16 (2017) (by using the phrase “notwithstanding any other statute,” the legislature had “expressly and definitely” declared one statute controlled over another statute’s “general exemption”).

“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Any, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1976)); see also City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., (“[T]he word ‘any’ is ‘broadly inclusive.’” ()).

City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elect., Inc., ¶ 10 (2017).

See id.; City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶ 16 (2017) (reasoning that by using “notwithstanding any other statute,” the legislature had “expressly and definitely” declared one statute controlled over another conflicting statute).

at 8; City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., ¶ 10 (2017).

See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc., ¶ 9 (2017) (we review legal issues de novo).

§ 32- 1133.01(A); see City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶¶ 16-18 (2017) (interpreting statutory language “[n]otwithstanding any other”).

See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., –47 ¶ 30 (2017) (“[E]jusdem generis applies ‘where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things.’” ( ¶ 13 (2003))); see also Williams v. Pipe Trades Indus.

See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶ 19 (2017) (“[W]e presume that the legislature, when it passes a statute, knows the existing laws.” ()).

Cf. City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., –47, ¶¶ 29, 32 (2017) (defining a written agreement “for” construction-related services covered by § 12-552 as one “with the purpose or object of” engaging such services); Evans Withycombe, 215 Ariz. at 242, ¶ 23.

v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. , , 147 ¶ 32, , 927 (2017).

See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., -45, ¶¶ 20-21 (2017).

v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., ¶¶ 16-18 (2017) (discussing phrase “notwithstanding any other statute” in context of statute of repose).

v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc., , (noting Legislature “has often used language such as ‘notwithstanding any other statute’ ...