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018 orders gave Mother “presumptive decision-making authority” if the parties could not “agree after making a good faith effort to reach an agreement,” it did not provide Mother with unfettered sole decision-making authority, see generally Nicaise 6 -69, ¶ 14 (2019) (distinguishing between joint legal decision-making with final decision-making authority and sole legal decision-making authority), nor did it preclude court intervention, as Mother suggests.

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, [and] consider[] the context.” ¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 34 (2011) (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quo

¶11 We review the interpretation of statutes de novo, ¶ 6 (2019), and the trial court’s refusal or failure to exercise discretion for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 16 (1998).

Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., ¶ 7 (2018); ¶ 6 (2019).

¶ 11 (App. 2003) (appellate court presumes the legislature intends to change the law when it substantively changes the language of a statute); ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

§ 25- 401(2); -69, ¶¶ 14-15 (2019).

Father assigns error to the court in not granting him “final” legal decision- making authority, or alternatively, in not ordering the parties to make use of co-parenting counseling or similar assistance to resolve legal decision- making issues between them.

Discussion ¶11 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., ¶ 7 (2018), as well as issues of statutory interpretation, ¶ 6 (2019).

§ 25-401(2)] with one parent having final authority over certain matters.” ¶¶ 13, 16-17 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 15 (App. 2018) (finding no denial of due process when brevity of parent’s testimony “was the product of her counsel’s strategic decisions regarding use of time at trial”), vacated in part on other grounds, ¶ 15 (2019).

Although the court did not find that Father posed a risk to the Children,2 its findings indicate the 1 In his opening brief, Father states, “It is well established that a finding of final legal decision-making authority amounts to a ” This is incorrect.

on [Father’s] tie-breaker authority.” ¶9

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

We strive “to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

The dissent’s reading of the sentence makes the final clause of the second sentence superfluous, violating a “cardinal principle of statutory interpretation.” ¶ 11 (2019); see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, 174 (“Whenever a reading arbitrarily ignores linguistic components or inadequately accounts for them, the reading may be presumed improbable.”) (citation and footnote omitted).

¶ 15 (App. 2018) (finding no due process violation where a party made a strategic decision regarding use of trial time and then failed to request additional time or make a proffer of evidence), vacated in part on other grounds, ¶ 17 (2019).

If possible, we give meaning “to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).