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Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., ¶ 7 (2018); ¶ 6 (2019).

¶ 11 (App. 2003) (appellate court presumes the legislature intends to change the law when it substantively changes the language of a statute); ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

§ 25- 401(2); -69, ¶¶ 14-15 (2019).

Father assigns error to the court in not granting him “final” legal decision- making authority, or alternatively, in not ordering the parties to make use of co-parenting counseling or similar assistance to resolve legal decision- making issues between them.

Discussion ¶11 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., ¶ 7 (2018), as well as issues of statutory interpretation, ¶ 6 (2019).

§ 25-401(2)] with one parent having final authority over certain matters.” ¶¶ 13, 16-17 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 15 (App. 2018) (finding no denial of due process when brevity of parent’s testimony “was the product of her counsel’s strategic decisions regarding use of time at trial”), vacated in part on other grounds, ¶ 15 (2019).

Although the court did not find that Father posed a risk to the Children,2 its findings indicate the 1 In his opening brief, Father states, “It is well established that a finding of final legal decision-making authority amounts to a ” This is incorrect.

on [Father’s] tie-breaker authority.” ¶9

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

We strive “to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

The dissent’s reading of the sentence makes the final clause of the second sentence superfluous, violating a “cardinal principle of statutory interpretation.” ¶ 11 (2019); see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, 174 (“Whenever a reading arbitrarily ignores linguistic components or inadequately accounts for them, the reading may be presumed improbable.”) (citation and footnote omitted).

¶ 15 (App. 2018) (finding no due process violation where a party made a strategic decision regarding use of trial time and then failed to request additional time or make a proffer of evidence), vacated in part on other grounds, ¶ 17 (2019).

If possible, we give meaning “to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

-69, ¶¶ 13-14 (2019) (explaining a hybrid joint legal decision-making order designating a “tie- breaking” parent is distinct from sole legal decision-making authority).

In doing so, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

§ 25-401(3), (6); Nicaise v. Sundaram (Nicaise II), ¶ 14 (2019) (“[A]n award of sole legal decision-making .