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“A 5 DONOFRIO v. GLASGOW Opinion of the Court cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019) (Nicaise II).

¶ 11 (2019); Navarro, 240 Ariz. at 195 ¶ 9.

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 9 (2025); ¶ 11 (2019).

Importantly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

§ 1-213; In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. at 19, ¶ 7 (“Absent a statutory definition, courts generally give words their ordinary meaning and may look to dictionary definitions.”); ¶ 11 (2019).

see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (statutes should be read “to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts”).

¶ 11 (2019) (agreeing that a statute should be read “to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012))).

Co., ¶ 8 (2023), and "interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject," ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 13 (2025) (noting that “[a] cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous” (alteration in original) ( ¶ 11 (2019))).

“We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” ().

As relevant here, joint legal decision making with final decision-making authority “creates shared legal decision-making with the possibility that one parent will exercise a superior right if the parents cannot reach a joint agreement in good faith.” –69 ¶ 14 (2019).

¶11 In interpreting a statute’s plain language, we review “the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 9 (2025) ( ¶ 11 (2019)).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 37 (2023) (Bolick, 23 NUNEZ v. VALENTE Catlett, J., Dissenting J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be highly anomalous to allow a special action to substit

to argue that a “global” final-say order is prohibited when parties share joint legal-decision making authority.

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.”

¶27 We analyze “the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

“We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 15 (2024) ( ¶ 11 (2019)).

This is significant because a “cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”

¶ 11 (2019); Preston v. Kindred Hosps.

See, opinion vacated in part, In re Nicaise v. Sundaram, 1 CA-CV 21-0319 FC, 2023 WL 4198070 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 27, 2023) (mem.

See Jordan, ¶¶ 19-20, 22; ¶¶ 1, 27-28 (App. 2018) (court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the parents and make parenting decisions for them”), vacated in part on other grounds, cf. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (in context of grandparent visitation decision by single parent, “the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination” of what best interests require).

In doing so, the court gives “meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

That is, we read statutes contextually “to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶20 “We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 15 (2024) ( ¶ 11 (2019)).

¶ 11 (2019) (we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).