Cited by

¶ 11 (2019) (“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.”).

§ 25-401(2), a court may “fashion hybrid” legal decision-making orders creating “shared legal decision- making with the possibility that one parent will exercise a superior right [final decision-making authority] if the parents cannot reach a joint agreement in good faith.” –69, ¶¶ 13–15 (2019).

And “[a] cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶16 “We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., ¶ 15 (2024) ( ¶ 11 (2019)).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, [and] consider[] the context.” ¶ 11 (2019); see also Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, ¶ 34 (2011) (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quo

¶ 11 (2019) (disapproving interpretations that render language superfluous).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶26 The State argues that because subsection (A)(1) directs valuation of “property,” “parcel[s],” and each “estate or interest” in property or parcels, the legislature intended “estate or interest” as something different from “property” or “parcel.” ¶ 11 (2018) (disapproving interpretations that render language superfluous).

We “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”

Not only would such an interpretation render superfluous the conditions for confidentiality set forth in § 30-805(B)’s first sentence, but it would also require us to read a broad exemption into the statute, see Roberts, (courts should not extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions).

We do not interpret statutory provisions in a vacuum, but “in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019); see also Glenayre Elect., Inc., 242 Ariz. at 145 ¶ 21 (“If, as the City asserts, § 12–552 neither applied to governmental entities .

(“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

In doing so, this court seeks “to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

Opinion of the Court grounds, § 25-324(A).

§ 1-213, and we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous,” ¶ 11 (2019) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., –53, ¶¶ 31–34 (2005)).

See id.; see also Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 298, 302 (10th Cir. 1995) (“ICWA specifically defines which ‘child custody proceedings’ are within its purview.”); ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174–79 (2012) (the surplusage canon); ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).