Cited by

§ 1-213, and we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous,” ¶ 11 (2019) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., –53, ¶¶ 31–34 (2005)).

“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

We do not interpret statutory provisions in a vacuum but “in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

decision); opinion vacated in part

(“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 11 (2018) (disapproving of an interpretation that renders a provision superfluous).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context.” see also Adams v. Comm’n on App. Ct. Appts., (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quoting Deal v. U

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶18 “Statutory interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of the words the legislature chose to use,” S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, ¶31 (Ariz. 2023), including giving meaning “to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous,” ¶ 11 (2019).

§ 25-403.03(E)(5); ¶ 11 (2019) ("A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.").

“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 11 (We must give meaning to every provision so that no provision is rendered superfluous.).

¶ 11 (2019) (We must “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 11 (2019) (We must “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“[E]very word and every provision is to be given effect.”).

¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 7 (2007) (stating that courts apply the same principles in interpreting statutes and rules).

We must “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

–69 ¶¶ 13–14 (2019) (“Awarding joint legal decision-making authority with final decision- making authority over certain matters to one parent under subsection (2) creates shared legal decision-making with the possibility that one parent will exercise a superior right if the parents cannot reach a joint agreement i

To derive that intent, we consider the “statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

§ 9021(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)(aa); ¶ 11 (2019) (The court must view “the entire text” of a statute and “give meaning .