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¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 7 (2007) (courts apply the same principles in interpreting statutes and rules).

If “act” in the definition of “delinquency” referred to the defendant’s act, rather than the child’s, this interpretation would make the word “act” in § 13-3613(A) superfluous, ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”), because a person would not “encourage” his or her own act to debase or injure the morals, health, or welfare of a child.

“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.” ¶ 11 (2019).

§ 13-105(10)—“intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “criminal negligence”—the proscribed conduct “necessarily involves a culpable mental state” in that it requires an individual’s activities to be “directed at locating or finding wildlife in a hunt area.” 3 § 13-202(B); R12-4-319(B), (E); (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

of Supr’s, ¶ 15 (2021) ( ¶ 11 (2019)).

“We interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 7 (2007) (courts apply the same principles in interpreting statutes and rules).

When construing a particular provision, we consider “the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

We derive that intent by examining the statute’s “entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019); see also Pinal Vista Properties, ¶ 10 (App. 2004) (explaining that statutes that relate to the same subject or the same general purpose “should be read in connection with, or should be construed with other related statutes, as though they constituted one law”)

See id.; ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, 9 TIMOTHY B. V. DCS/H.B.

To derive that intent, we consider the “statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.” ¶ 11 (2019).

¶ 11 (2019) (stating statutory language is appropriately interpreted in context).

We may consider whether counsel moved for more time and if the alleged error resulted from counsel’s “strategic decisions regarding use of time at trial.” ¶ 15 (App. 2018), vacated in part on other grounds, ¶ 17 (2019); see also Gamboa, 223 Ariz. at 402-03, ¶¶ 15-18 (holding the court did not err in cutting off cross-examination where counsel chose to use time to examine other witnesses and did not move for more time).

018 orders gave Mother “presumptive decision-making authority” if the parties could not “agree after making a good faith effort to reach an agreement,” it did not provide Mother with unfettered sole decision-making authority, see generally Nicaise 6 -69, ¶ 14 (2019) (distinguishing between joint legal decision-making with final decision-making authority and sole legal decision-making authority), nor did it preclude court intervention, as Mother suggests.

¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, [and] consider[] the context.” ¶ 11 (2019); ¶ 34 (2011) (“[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.’” (quo

¶11 We review the interpretation of statutes de novo, ¶ 6 (2019), and the trial court’s refusal or failure to exercise discretion for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 16 (1998).