Cited by

See Columbus, (“[W]e view ‘the statute as a whole’ to ‘give meaningful operation to all of its provisions.’” ()).

¶15 Unlike in an equity action—where a showing of actual damages is required before punitive damages may be awarded, –86 (1991)—the statute text at issue here expressly provides a claimant in a statutory action per A.R.S.

To discern that meaning, "we may consider the context of the provision, 'the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.'" ¶ 33 (2021) ().

Co. v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., ().

Thus, we interpret statutes “as a whole, and give 9 PIMA COUNTY, ET AL. v. STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL. Opinion of the Court meaningful operation to all of [their] provisions.”

See Columbus Life Ins., 255 Ariz. at 385 ¶ 11 (noting “we view ‘the statute as a whole’ to ‘give meaningful operation to all of its provisions’” ()); Silver, 244 Ariz. at 558 ¶ 16.

clearly and plainly manifest[s] an intent’ to have the statute do so.” ()) (alterations in original).

If there is only one reasonable interpretation, we apply that interpretation, but if the language is ambiguous, we consider such factors as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” ().

4 FRANKLIN v. CSAA GENERAL INSURANCE Opinion of the Court Elections Comm’n v. Brain, ¶ 11 (2014) ().

Opinion of the Court supplemented, or abrogated by statute, it must be done expressly or by necessary implication.”

¶13 The parties disagree about the meaning of the statutorily undefined word “franchise.” When we interpret statutes, the primary goal “is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”

(explaining that, in interpreting an ambiguous statute, “the court must read the statute as a whole, and give meaningful operation to all of its provisions.”).

¶26 “The primary principle of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”

We look first to the language of the statute because it is the best indication of the legislature’s intent, id., and construe statutes that “relate to the same subject matter or have the same general purpose as one another” as though they constitute one law, ¶ 27 (App. 2011); (Different sections of a single statute should be interpreted consistently.).

Therefore, to discern its meaning, we may consider the context of the provision, “the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.”

Comm’n, interpreting different sections of a single statute consistently

Cf. Wyatt v. Wehmueller , , 284, , 873 (1991) ("A court also should interpret two sections of the same statute consistently, especially when they use identical language.").

(“A court also 6 DIGNITY v. FARMERS Decision of the Court should interpret two sections of the same statute consistently, especially when they use identical language.”).

If we conclude the statutes are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, “we consider other factors, including ‘the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’” ¶ 12 (2015) ().