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However, if it is ambiguous, we may consider other factors such as “‘the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’” Id.

the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 234 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 11, 322 P.3d at 142 ( ).

v. Gaines, (within constitutional limits, legislature may alter common law “when its intent to do so is ‘clearly and plainly manifest[ed]’”), (alteration in Gaines).

(“historical background” and “spirit and purpose” of legislation may be considered in determining legislative intent).

§ 12-2236 does not abrogate common law forms of waiver); (“[A]bsent a manifestation of legislative intent to repeal a common law rule, we will construe statutes as consistent with the common law”); (explaining that if the common law is to be “changed, supplemented, or abrogated by statute,” such a change must be express or a necessary implication of the statutory language).

If the law is ambiguous, “[w]e consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as ‘the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’ ” Brain, , 322 P.3d at 142

If it is ambiguous, however, we consider other factors, including “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.”

See Wyatt v. 13 (“plaintiff must be entitled to actual damages before being entitled to punitive damages”).

Further, if the statutory language is not clear, we may consider other factors, including “the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.”

But if the statute is ambiguous, we consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” (citation omitted).

But if the statute is ambiguous, we consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” (citation omitted).

Finally, we “must read the statute as a whole, and give meaningful operation to all of its provisions.”

(noting that when the statute’s language is not clear, we determine legislative intent by considering factors such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose).

(“Each word, phrase, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be [void], inert, redundant, or trivial.”); , (“A court also should interpret two sections of the same statute consistently, especially when they use identical language.”).

For example, damages may not be recovered from a client when his attorney filed a lis pendens without the client‟s knowledge or consent.

Accordingly, we must apply principles of statutory construction and “give effect to the legislative intent” by reading the statute as a whole and considering “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.”

lausible interpretations of the statute and the plain language does not unambiguously address the issue presented, we “must read the statute as a whole, and give meaningful operation to all of its provisions,” by considering “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” , see Dietz v. Gen.