Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Dietz v. General Electric Co., 821 P.2d 166.

101 citing documents.

State v. Hon. mahoney/ragsdale Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Hon. mahoney/ragsdale Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Co., "[w]ith certain exceptions .
State v. Mahoney in and for County of Maricopa 442 P.3d 374 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Mahoney in and for County of Maricopa 442 P.3d 374 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Co. , , "[w]ith certain exceptions ...
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Graciela Leija 422 P.3d 1033 Ariz. 2018
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Graciela Leija 422 P.3d 1033 Ariz. 2018
Co., (noting that “the lien provisions in favor of immune employers have been part of the workers’ compensation system since 1925”).
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano 375 P.3d 69 Ariz. 2016
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano 375 P.3d 69 Ariz. 2016
Co., 511, 172 (1991) (holding that “[w]hen an employer negligently contributes to an employee’s injury, the joint tortfeasors may require the employer’s negligence to be considered for the assessment of fault under A.R.S.
Jeanette M. Sanders v. Francis Alger 375 P.3d 1199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Jeanette M. Sanders v. Francis Alger 375 P.3d 1199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Co., (jury finding of nonparty at fault “does not subject the nonparty to liability”).
Keenan Reed-Kaliher v. Hon. hoggat/state 347 P.3d 136 Ariz. 2015
Keenan Reed-Kaliher v. Hon. hoggat/state 347 P.3d 136 Ariz. 2015
Co., (noting that when “more than one interpretation [of a statute] is plausible, we ordinarily interpret the statute in such a way as to achieve the general legislative goals that can be adduced from the body of legislation in question”).
John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos 326 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos 326 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Co., (first emphasis added; second 4 JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS Opinion of the Court emphasis in Dietz).
Loftus v. Arizona State University Public Safety Personnel Retirement System Local Board 255 P.3d 1020 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Loftus v. Arizona State University Public Safety Personnel Retirement System Local Board 255 P.3d 1020 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Co., , (when statute susceptible to more than one construction and legislative intent unascertainable, “we ordinarily interpret the statute in such a way as to achieve the general legislative goals that can be adduced from the body of legislation”).
Young v. Beck 251 P.3d 380 Ariz. 2011
Young v. Beck 251 P.3d 380 Ariz. 2011
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, ).
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc. 172 P.3d 410 Ariz. 2007
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc. 172 P.3d 410 Ariz. 2007
Acuna v. Hampton And Kroack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, see also Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp., 194 Ariz. 142, ¶ 5, (under UCATA, “‘each tortfeasor in a personal injury action is liable only for his or her share of fault’”)
Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo 79 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo 79 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Co., , , 603 n. 9, , 823 n. 9 (1990).
In Re Leon G. 59 P.3d 779 Ariz. 2002
In Re Leon G. 59 P.3d 779 Ariz. 2002
Co., , (explaining that when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
West v. State 58 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
West v. State 58 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Co., , (emphasis omitted).
In Re the Detention of Wilber W. 53 P.3d 1145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
In Re the Detention of Wilber W. 53 P.3d 1145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Co., , (when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
Weber v. Tucson Electric Power Co. 47 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Weber v. Tucson Electric Power Co. 47 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
But, with the abrogation of joint and several liability and the corresponding ability *506 of a third-party tortfeasor to name an employer as a nonparty at fault, , the court concluded that the appropriate interpretation of the lien statute required achieving “a reasonable balance between the rights of employer and employee, consistent with the underlying goals of the compensation scheme.” Aitken, 183 Ariz. at 392 , 904 P.2d at 461 .
Gunnell v. Arizona Public Service Co. 46 P.3d 399 Ariz. 2002
Gunnell v. Arizona Public Service Co. 46 P.3d 399 Ariz. 2002
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, ).
State v. Ehrlich 26 P.3d 481 Ariz. 2001
In Re Leon G. 26 P.3d 481 Ariz. 2001
State v. Ehrlich 26 P.3d 481 Ariz. 2001
Co., , (when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
In Re Leon G. 26 P.3d 481 Ariz. 2001
Co., , (when the meaning of a statutory term is not clear, we look to the overall language of the statute for assistance).
Fehribach v. Smith 22 P.3d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Fehribach v. Smith 22 P.3d 508 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Co., (the underlying public policy of these statutes is to make each person “responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more "j. 1 *73 ¶ 14 To explain why a complete shield to owner liability in present circumstances would clash with fundamental principles of comparative fau
Gunnell v. Arizona Public Service Co. 18 P.3d 176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix 4 P.3d 413 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix 4 P.3d 413 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Co., -10 , -71 (1991) (adoption of comparative fault and contribution among tortfeasors, with abrogation of joint liability, established system “making each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault, and no more”)); see also Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 55, ¶21 , 961 P.2d at 453 (jur
Lowry v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 989 P.2d 152 Ariz. 1999
Lowry v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 989 P.2d 152 Ariz. 1999
Frederikson v. Maricopa County 3 P.3d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Frederikson v. Maricopa County 3 P.3d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Duarte v. State 971 P.2d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Duarte v. State 971 P.2d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Co., , (defendants may constitutionally name immune employer as non-party at fault in negligence action even though apportionment of fault may effectively reduce plaintiffs recovery from other defendants).
Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Co., , (joint tortfeasor may require employer’s negligence to be considered for assessment of fault under A.R.S.