Cited by

Co., (“Silence in and of itself, in the absence of any indication that the legislature has considered the interpretation, is not instructive.”).

Co., (“The purpose of § 20–259.01 is, broadly speaking, to ‘close the gap in protection under the [FRA] .

¶13 As such, consistent with our duty to faithfully apply precedent unless “the reasons for it” no longer exist or it is “clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong,” ¶ 20 (2022) (), we reaffirm the rule stated in Dickey: The anti-abrogation clause only prohibits abrogation of rights of action that existed at statehood or that are based in rights of action existing at statehood.

The stare decisis doctrine cautions courts against overruling a prior opinion unless the reasons underlying it no longer exist or the opinion was “clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.” –92 ¶ 20 (2022) ().

Co., (describing stare decisis as “a doctrine of persuasion” that honors prior decisions unless, in addition to other considerations, they are “clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”).

But “[w]e are mindful of the importance of stare decisis,” ¶ 30 (2013), and “do not lightly overrule precedent and do so only for compelling reasons,” (quoting Wiley v. Indus.

“[T]he degree of adherence demanded by a prior judicial decision depends upon its merits, and it may be abandoned if the reasons for it have ceased to exist or if it was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.”

Co. , , 103, , 726 (1993) (a statute's language, "where clear and unequivocal, controls [a] statute's meaning unless it leads to absurd or impossible results"); see also Lychwick , , ¶ 9, (recognizing absurdity and impossibility exceptions).

Co., -07, -30 (1993) (reviewing policy and holding physical contact with uninsured motor vehicle not required to trigger policy).

Co., , (“It makes sense to infer that the legislature approves judicial interpretation of a statute when we have some reason to believe that the legislature has considered and declined to reject that interpretation.”).

Co., (“Exclusions and limitations on coverage are generally invalid unless contemplated by the statute.”).

Co., “[w]hether an opinion will be given prospective application only is a policy question within this court’s discretion,” Fain Land &

Co., , see also Ariz. Water Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., , Padilla v. Indus.