Cited by

Ctr., 259 Ariz. at 190 ¶ 24 ( ¶ 1, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (reviewing order awarding sole custody of children to mother and allowing her to relocate with children), and ¶ 13 (1999) (reviewing the interpretation of a decedent’s will)).

¶11 Appellants acknowledge that Arizona follows a no-reformation rule for wills, see Matter of Blacksill’s Estate, and that courts consider extrinsic evidence only when an ambiguity exists, -79, ¶ 10 (1999) (“A will is ambiguous when the written language is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions.” (citation modified)); (“[Extrinsic] evidence is not admissible to alter or contradict the plain terms of the will, but, if the terms be ambiguous, [extrinsic]

This Court does not reassess “conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence, but examine[s] the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s action.” ¶ 13 (1999).

but examine the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s action.” ¶ 13 (1999).

“Substantial evidence is evidence which would permit a reasonable person to reach the trial court’s result.” ¶ 13 (1999).

¶ 13 (1999) (citations omitted).

See, ¶ 16 (App. 2009); ¶ 13 (1999).

Mental Health No. MH 2008-000097, ().

¶ 13 (1999) (“In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence.”).

¶ 13 (App. 2018) ( ¶ 13 (1999)).

¶ 13 (1999) (“In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence, but examine the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s action.”).

We defer to the superior court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them, Kocher v. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 9 (App. 2003), without reweighing conflicting evidence on appeal, ¶ 13 (1999).

¶ 13 (1999); ¶¶ 18–19 (App. 2009).

¶ 13 (1999) (this court examines “the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support” the superior court’s action).

¶ 16 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 13, 580 ¶ 18 (1999)).

See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16; ¶ 13 (1999) (“In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence but examine the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s action.”).

¶ 13 (1999); Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Centers, L.L.C., ¶ 27 (App. 2007).

s next argues Miranda and Michael did not meet their “burden to prove that they did not consent to Thomas’[s] appointment.” “In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence, but examine the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s action.” ¶ 13 (1999).

¶ 13 (1999) (“Substantial evidence is evidence which would permit a reasonable person to reach the trial court’s result.”).