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Arizona may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Van Ho if the record shows: (1) purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting business in Arizona by Van Ho; (2) AHHG’s claim “arises out of or relates to” Van Ho’s contacts with Arizona (sometimes referred to as the required “nexus”) and (3) “the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.” ¶ 7 (2000) (citation omitted).

¶ 5 (2000); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Burger King Corp. v. Rodzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985).

Nevertheless, a court’s general jurisdiction over nonresidents is proper only where their “level of contact” with the forum state is “quite high.” Ameika, 1 CA-CV 24-0045, at *3 ¶ 14 ( ¶ 6 (2000)).

This nexus requirement among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation is “the key to exercising specific jurisdiction.” ¶ 11 (2000).

But a court cannot properly exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident unless the nonresident’s “level of contact” with the forum state is “quite high.” ¶ 6 (2000).

See Planning Grp., 226 Ariz. at 265–70 ¶¶ 13, 16, 25, 29, 37; ¶ 11 (2000).

See Planning Grp., 226 Ariz. at 265–70, ¶¶ 13, 16, 25, 29, 37; ¶ 11 (2000).

The test for personal jurisdiction considers whether a defendant has “sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” ¶ 6 (2000) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)), and thus hinges on “the nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s relationship to the forum State,’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.

P. 13.5(a) and 16.1(b), and “may not be alleged after the verdict is returned,” see also State v. Benak, 199 Ariz. 1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling.

To establish personal jurisdiction, a defendant must have “sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ¶ 6 (2000); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).

¶ 6 (2000) (recognizing the correct test for personal jurisdiction would be whether “the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are 6 IANNI v. ST.

A foreign corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in Arizona if: (1) it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Arizona; (2) the claim asserted “arises out of or relates to” IMVU’s contact with Arizona; and (3) “the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.” ¶ 7 (2000).

See Planning Grp., 226 Ariz. at 266-70, ¶¶ 16, 25, 29, 37; ¶ 11 (2000).

A rebuttable presumption of personal jurisdiction arises if Wife shows that Husband purposefully established “sufficient minimum contacts with [Arizona] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ¶¶ 6-7 (2000) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific, Planning Grp., 262 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 13, but always requires a fact- intensive inquiry to determine whether its exercise comports with traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice,” -4, ¶ 8 (2000) (citations omitted).

see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 , 66 S.Ct.

There is no mechanical test or formula to follow in deciding whether personal jurisdiction exists; instead we must weigh the specific facts of each case to determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction would comport with notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” -4, ¶ 8 (2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

“Under either specific or general jurisdiction, ‘the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established “minimum contacts” in the forum State.’” ¶ 6 (2000) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).

at 266, 270, ¶¶ 16, 25, 37 , 246 P.3d at 347, 351 ; ¶ 11

¶8 Personal jurisdiction is described as being either “general” or “specific.”