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The plain language of Rule 58 “contemplates its use as a means to object to the form of judgment only, not its substance.”

(appellate courts apply the same standard used by the superior court).

v. Allen, ¶ 14 (App. 2012); 195 (App. 1990).

(holding that summary judgment is improper “where the evidence or inferences would permit a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party[]”).

“Any evidence or reasonable inference contrary to the material facts—i.e., the facts which the moving party needs to show his entitlement to judgment—will preclude summary judgment.”

A community obligation is presumed “when either spouse incurs a debt during marriage for the benefit of the marital community,” and the presumption can be overcome only by “clear and convincing evidence that the debt is the separate obligation of one spouse.”

Wells Fargo Bank, 231 Ariz. at 213, ¶ 18; (plaintiff movant must “produc[e] uncontroverted prima facie evidence in support of its motion” for summary judgment).

on which Borowsky also relies, where the motion for summary judgment “revealed on its face that summary judgment was not warranted.” 167 Ariz. at 193.

¶ 29 (App. 2019) ( (“[W]e [do not] see any reason why the [community obligation] presumption should be negated by the fact that the husband used his separate property to secure the community loans.”)

-97 (App. 1990) (“If the [moving party]’s motion failed to make a prima facie case .

Furthermore, “where the evidence or inferences would permit a [reasonable trier of fact] to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.” ¶19 Here, Malhotra’s testimony regarding the allocation of the settlement proceeds does not clearly negate the conversion claim.

“The burden of persuasion on [a] summary judgment motion is heavy” and “‘[w]here the evidence or inferences would permit a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.’” Nat’l

After reviewing the record, the court may grant summary judgment only if the moving party has “demonstrate[d] both the absence of any factual conflict and his or her right to judgment.”

If the evidence would allow “a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.”

Servs., ¶ 20 , (“Absent a showing that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment, the party opposing the motion need not even respond, and the failure to respond cannot in itself entitle the moving party to summary judgment.”)

195, , 1016 (App. 1990).

of Regents, , ); , (recognizing that although our review of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is made on the basis of the record made in the trial court, our review is de novo).

use[d by the superior court when] ruling on the summary judgment motion.” Id.

If the evidence would allow “a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.”

(citing Chanay, 115 Ariz. at 38 , 563 P.2d at 293 ); ¶ 21 , (stating that Rule 7.1(b) "is not mandatory, and the failure to respond does not in and of itself authorize a judgment against the nonmoving p

P.2d 1012 (App. 1990) (party opposing summary judgment must respond with facts showing genuine issue if movant offers evidence demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment); (“Ordinarily, courts should not consider new factual theories