Cited by

Regardless of this deferential standard, “this [C]ourt retains the ultimate authority to find facts, make conclusions of law, and impose discipline.” (“In reviewing disciplinary proceedings .

Despite this deferential standard, “this [C]ourt retains the ultimate authority to find facts, make conclusions of law, and impose discipline.” (“In reviewing disciplinary proceedings, .

When there is no allegation of improper motive, an argument is not objectively frivolous for purposes of ARCAP 25 sanctions “if the issues raised are supported by any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable legal argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could differ.”

("In reviewing disciplinary proceedings[,] .

–53 (1993) (finding an appeal frivolous because it was unsupported by any 7 BEST v. VILLARREAL, et al. Decision of the Court reasonable legal theory and presented no colorable argument); see also ARCAP 13(a)(6)–(7).

We apply an objective test to determine whether an appeal is “frivolous” under ARCAP 25, analyzing whether “the issues raised are supportable by any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable legal argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could differ[.]”

-53 (1993) (finding an appeal frivolous because it was unsupported by a reasonable legal theory and presented no colorable argument); see also ARCAP 13(a)(6)-(7).

& n.11, -99 & 299 n.11 (App. 2008).

reasonable penalties or damages.” We impose sanctions under Rule 25 only ‘“with great reservation,’” Ariz. Tax Research Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, , and we decline to do so when “the issues raised are supportable by any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable legal argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could differ.”

not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); ¶ 11, (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171, (indicating that the knowledge required for setting a higher sanction for professional misconduct is “knowledge that [respondent] may have been violating

ould not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); ¶ 11 , (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); , (indicating that the knowledge required for setting a higher sanction for professional misconduct is “knowledge that [respondent] may have been violating an ethical rule”).

He also contends that more egregious conduct by other licensed professionals resulted in less-severe sanctions, relying on , and