Cited by

see also State v. 5 –62 (1980); United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 990 (7th Cir. 2016).

(holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give Willits instruction based on purported removal of documents from police file; defendant’s claim that “allegedly missing” documents “would have supported his theory of the case” was “entirely speculative” because documents’ “contents” were “unkn

“For pre-indictment delay to violate due process, a defendant must show that (1) the delay was intended to gain a tactical advantage or to harass him, and (2) the delay actually and substantially prejudiced him.”

–51 (App. 1996); Broughton, 156 Ariz. at 398.

(quoting In re C.B.N., 499 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.

(“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary .

Courts consistently hold that diminished recollection by witnesses does not, by itself, constitute the type of substantial prejudice warranting a finding of a due process violation.”); Wills, 177 Ariz. at 594-95; (The mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient.).

¶16 Evidence is constitutionally material when it possesses “an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (quotation omitted).

466 (App. 1996) (finding no prejudice from improper but "merely cumulative" testimony).

(finding loss of witnesses insufficient to establish prejudice without a showing their testimony would have impacted the verdict).

(quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).

Prosecutorial vouching, however, requires “personal assurances” made by the prosecutor “of a witness’ truthfulness.” 3 ¶ 86 (2018) (prosecutor’s comments did not constitute vouching because she did not “use ‘I’ or ‘me’ to

(“[B]ecause the defendant elicited [a statement] to show the inadequacy of the investigation, and did not offer it for the truth of the matter asserted, it was not hearsay.”).

–57 (App. 1996) (holding that erroneous exclusion of cumulative evidence did not require reversal).

5 STATE v. BRAXTON Decision of the Court assurances of a witness’s truthfulness

“A coconspirator’s statements are admissible when it has been shown that a conspiracy exists and the defendant and the declarant are parties to the conspiracy.” (citation and internal quotations omitted).

(noting that prejudice must be actual, substantial, and not speculative); see also State ex rel.

-57, - 34 (App. 1996) (explaining an erroneous evidentiary ruling excluding cumulative evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).