Cited by

Among other things, “the unavailability of a key witness may constitute an extraordinary circumstance.” ¶ 11 (App. 1998) (citation modified).

¶¶ 20–22 (App. 1998) (noting that a defendant must show he was prejudiced by a Rule 8.2 delay for there to be reversible error).

(A person’s absence may constitute an extraordinary circumstance under Rule 8 justifying a continuance.); ¶ 11 (App. 1998) (A continuance may not be warranted when a key witness’s scheduling conflict can be foreseen and avoided.); (similar).

¶ 22 (App. 1998) (a defendant who fails to establish that his defense was prejudiced or that he was deprived of a fair trial has not established prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal of his conviction under a speedy trial right violation).

¶ 8 (App. 1998) ([W]e will not reverse [a continuance] on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse [of discretion] and resulting prejudice.”); –40 (1997) (Courts consider four factors in speedy trial claims: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether

–49, ¶¶ 30–31 (App. 1998).

(finding no reversible error when “defendant ha[d] not established that the technical speedy trial error in this case prejudiced his defense in any way or deprived him of a fair trial.”); (“There was no apparent impairment of appellee’s ability to defend herse

¶16 Fields argues the court erred by granting continuances due to unavailable State witnesses

6 STATE v. RALSTON-GONZALES Decision of the Court avoided.” –45, ¶ 11 (App. 1998).

See Granados, 172 Ariz. at 407; see also Garcia, 170 Ariz. at 248 (court must make a “reasoned finding” regarding the interests of justice); ¶ 22 (App. 1998) (noting that, in the related context of a speedy trial violation, assessing prejudice turns on “whether defendant has shown that his defense has been harmed by the delay; it is not sufficient for a defendant to contend that the state may not have made its case had the trial proceeded without the

The State cites subsequent appellate decisions holding that a defendant “cannot wait until after the [Rule 8.2] period has expired and then claim a Rule 8 violation after it is too late for the trial court to prevent the violation.” ¶ 25 (App. 1998) (“Rule 8 requires a defendant to notify the court of an impending speedy trial deadline in order to preserve his objection to a Rule 8 violation.”).

¶ 2 (App. 1998) (“[I]n the absence of a showing of prejudice, a speedy trial violation raised as error on appeal after conviction does not warrant reversal of that conviction.”).

¶ 3 , (“[I]n the absence of a showing of prejudice, a speedy trial violation raised as error on appeal after conviction does not warrant reversal of that conviction.”).

¶ 13 , (holding that a speedy trial violation without a showing of prejudice does not warrant reversal).

(defendant must show prejudice in addition to speedy trial violation).

P. 8.2(a)(1); 9 ¶ 8 , (“The right to a speedy trial is both constitutional and statutory.”); ¶ 19 , (state speedy trial rule is “more restrictive than the constitutional right to speedy trial”).