Cited by

¶ 17 (App. 2009) (we will not “judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require”); ¶¶ 18- 19 (2023).

While giving reasons for denying a sealing petition would assist us with review, we will 3 STATE v. DIES Decision of the Court not “judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.” ¶ 17 (App. 2009).

¶ 46 (App. 1998); ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (explaining we presume that the court knows and applies the correct law unless that presumption is rebutted by the record).

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (this Court presumes that the superior court knows and correctly applies the law unless the record contradicts that presumption).

See Mesa, ___ Ariz. at ___, ¶27 ( ¶ 16, (App. 2009)) ("Although the court must make findings consistent with [A.R.S.]

¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard principles of statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.” (citation omitted)).

Although the court must make findings 9 MESA v. O’CONNOR Opinion of the Court consistent with § 25-411(J), these findings need not be “reduced to writing or stated on the record.” ¶ 16 (App. 2009).3 ¶28 Here, the court required Child and Father to engage in reunification therapy and allowed Father parenting time conditioned on Child’s choice to spend time with Father.

Although the court “must ‘find’ certain facts” to impose parenting time restrictions, the statute does not require that the “findings be reduced to writing or stated on the record.” ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard principles of statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.”); ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places wi

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (We presume the superior court knows and applies the correct legal standard.); State v. 7 ¶ 38 (App. 2005) (Judges are “presume

§ 25-411; ¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2009) (holding that absent a statutory requirement to make written findings, courts are not required to do so).

§ 25-403(B); ¶ 9 (App. 2009).

See, ¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2009) (recognizing that A.R.S.

§ 25-403(B); -87, ¶ 13 (App. 2009)).

¶ 16 (App. 2009); ¶ 15 (App. 2012) (We may infer additional findings necessary to sustain a judgment when the evidence reasonably supports such conclusions and the inferred finding does not conflict with an express finding.).

§ 13-910 contains no credible-threat requirement, and this court will “not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.” ¶ 17 (App. 2009).3 3 Nor has Tovar shown a violation of his constitutional rights.

¶ 16 (App. 2009) (holding that court may order supervised parenting time sua sponte).

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (appellate courts presume the trial court knows the law and applies it correctly); (“The .

¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard principles of statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.”).

v. Lincoln Found., Inc., ¶ 17 (App. 2004) (this court considers an issue not raised in an appellant’s opening brief as abandoned or conceded), and has thus failed to rebut the presumption that the court properly reviewed for apportionment, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (appellate courts presume the trial court knows the law and applies it correctly); see also Brewer v. Peterson, 9 Ariz.App.

e of supervision the children’s physical health 4 LUVISI v. ELLISON Decision of the Court would be endangered or their emotional development significantly impaired or that unsupervised parenting time would seriously endanger the children’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” ¶ 16 (App. 2009); see also A.R.S.