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It is possible here to determine which facts and findings apply to which factors, -87, ¶ 13 (App. 2009), this is not a case where a detailed weighing of the statutory factors “may have yielded a different outcome.” Accordingly, it would serve no purpose to remand for further findings here because the court has already recited the findings on which its judgment is based.

¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2009) (recognizing § 25-411.J—formerly § 25- 411.D—only requires the superior court find “certain facts in order to grant the specified relief” but does not require the “findings be reduced to writing or stated on the record”).

¶ 17 (App. 2009) (principles of statutory construction require this court to “not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require”).

¶ 14 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 11 (App. 2002)).

Id.; ¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard principles of statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.”).

can constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal and a remand.” ¶ 9 (App. 2009).

¶¶ 16–17 (App. 2009) (court will not impose requirement for written findings where the statute only requires that the court “‘find’ certain facts in order to grant the specified relief” but does not require the “findings be reduced to witting or stated on the record”).

See, 188 ¶¶ 16, 18 (App. 2009) (holding that endangerment standard applied to order requiring supervised parenting time).

See, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (concluding the finding of serious endangerment in what is now A.R.S.

Id.; ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (noting that the superior court is presumed to apply the correct legal standard unless the record clearly shows otherwise).

¶6 “Although we presume that the trial court knows the law and applies the correct standard, that presumption may be rebutted by the record.” ¶ 18 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 32 (App. 2004); ).

§ 25-403(B); -87, ¶ 13 (App. 2009).

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (noting that the superior court is presumed to apply the correct legal standard unless the record clearly shows otherwise).

Notwithstanding our holding, Burgess’s argument still fails because as a matter of judicial restraint and standard principles of statutory construction, we will not “judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.” ¶ 17 (App. 2009).

See Little, 193 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 5; ¶ 19 (App. 2009) (vacating parenting-time determination when court's order showed it had applied incorrect legal standard).

Hart v. Hart , , 187-88, ¶¶ 16-19, , 445-46 (App. 2009).

¶ 16 (App. 2009) (comparing the requirement that a best-interests finding be specified on the record according to A.R.S.

¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2009) (recognizing current A.R.S.

¶15 Neither the relevant statutes nor Webb requires the Board to make an express finding that potential or actual harm is “unreasonable under the circumstances.” “The legislature knows how to make written findings a requirement.” ¶ 17 (App. 2009); see, e.g., A.R.S.