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The court has a “duty to hear all competent evidence offered in determining a child’s best interests when making a custody decision.” ¶ 9 (App. 2009).

¶9 The court has a “duty to hear all competent evidence offered in determining a child’s best interests when making a custody decision.” ¶ 9 (App. 2009).

Father claims the listed cases address the following relocation factors: • whether a relocation request is made in good faith; • the prospective advantages and a parent’s motive for requesting or opposing relocation; • the likelihood of a parent’s compliance with parenting time orders; • whether relocation allows a realistic opportunity for parenting time with each parent; • whether relocation en

¶7 While the general rule is that an issue not raised before the trial court is waived on appeal, see, “neither Trantor nor its progeny has created an unalterable rule of waiver,” ¶ 16 (App. 2009); (noting waiver rule “is procedural, not jurisdictional”).

To the contrary, such findings exist to “aid[] all parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the child or children both currently and in the future.”

But waiver is discretionary, not “an unalterable rule.” ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶ 18 (App. 2009); ¶ 18 (App. 2020) (Whether imposed by the court or agreed to by the parties, the parenting provisions of a decree or other order represent a snapshot of the child’s best interests and form the baseline from which future courts assess whether a materi

See Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 344, ¶ 18; ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (explaining the requirement for findings on the record is to provide a baseline for “any future petitions by either party based on ‘changed circumstances”’).

(appellate courts generally will not address issues for the first time on appeal).

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citations omitted).

¶ 13 (1999); ¶¶ 18–19 (App. 2009).

¶ 12 (App. 2009); 3 MICHAELS v. SHIMO Decision of the Court ¶ 11 (App. 2009) (noting a court abuses its discretion when it fails to make findings required by the statute).

¶¶ 12-13 (App. 2009); Diezsi, 201 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 5; -22, ¶¶ 9-12 (App. 2003) (holding that the court abused its discretion in changing the primary residential parent and altering the parenting time schedule without making required findings on the record in a contest

See In re MH 2007-001264, ¶ 5 (App. 2008); ¶ 8 (App. 2009).

of a meaningful opportunity to assess the family court’s best interests finding.” ¶¶ 13, 20 (App. 2009).

DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 12 (findings will not be inferred); –10, ¶¶ 19–20 (App. 2009) (superior court must make A.R.S.

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (in part, the rationale for A.R.S.

children both currently and in the future.” Reid v. 4 ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

Mother notes that the waiver doctrine is not "an unalterable rule[,]" ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and argues that application of the doctrine in this instance is inappropriate because the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court "provide no post-verdict/trial procedure to challenge a termination order."

§ 25-403(B); ¶ 20 (App. 2009) (“The lack of findings in this case was error as a matter of law, which deprived this court of a meaningful opportunity to assess the family court’s 8 FRANCINE C. v. DCS Opinion of the Court best i

Christopher K., 233 Ariz. at 301, ¶ 19 (holding that a court’s denial of a petition to modify after finding domestic violence existed “must be justified by specific findings on the record demonstrating the reasons for the court’s decision”); ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (explaining the requirement for specific findings exists not only to aid an appellant and the reviewing court but also to aid all parties and the family court in determining the best interests of the children both currently and in the future