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Though the court certainly could have afforded each party additional time, the court has discretion to “impose reasonable time limits appropriate to the proceedings.” ARFLP 22(a); ¶ 13 (App. 2010) (“[A] trial court has broad discretion over the management of a trial.”).

However, “to merit reversal, a party must show they incurred some harm as a result of [a] court’s time limitations.” ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citation and internal quotation omitted).

¶ 16 (App. 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s procedural due process challenge to time limits imposed at trial in part because plaintiff “did not request additional time”).

-03 ¶¶ 12, 16-18 (App. 2010) (rejecting appellant’s claim that “the trial court violated his due process rights” by allowing insufficient time for cross-examination in part because “he did not request additional time” or “make an offer of proof”).

“[T]o merit reversal, a party must show they incurred some harm as a result of [a] court’s time limitations.” ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13 (App. 2010) (Trial courts have “broad discretion over the management of a trial.”).

– 03, ¶¶ 12–18 (App. 2010) (concluding that time limitations imposed by the superior court did not merit reversal when the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how those limitations harmed his case).

(holding that “absent extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal”); –03, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (holding that to show prejudice warranting reversal, a party must make an offer of proof stating with reasonable specificity what the evidence would have shown).

To merit reversal, a party must show “they incurred some harm as a result of [a] court’s time limitations.” ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. U.S. Fid.

¶ 13 (App. 2010) (recognizing the court’s “broad discretion over the management of a trial”); Ariz. R. Evid.

When a trial court excludes evidence, “the complaining party must make ‘an offer of proof stating with reasonable specificity what the evidence would have shown.’” ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).

¶ 17 (App. 2010) (quoting Brown v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar.

t did not violate Father’s rights because he attempted to read “a self-authored speech from his attorney chair, when he would have taken the stand if he had an attorney.” ¶20 “[A] trial court has broad discretion over the management of a trial, and although it may place [] limitations on trial proceedings, any limitations must be reasonable under the circumstances.” ¶ 13 (App. 2010) (internal citation omitted).

But a party asserting a denial of due process must show prejudice, ¶ 17 (App. 2010), and Father has shown none.

¶ 20 (App. 2014); ¶ 13 (App. 2010) (stating superior court has broad discretion over the management of a trial and may place time limitations on trial proceedings).

¶ 13 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).

We review a trial court’s decision on the mode and order of trial for abuse of discretion, ¶ 13, but review de novo the interpretation of court rules, ¶ 10

The court was entitled to consider whether Wife’s inability to present additional evidence stemmed, in part, from her own trial-time management decisions.3 ¶¶ 13-16, Volk, 235 Ariz. at 469, ¶ 22, 333 P.3d at 796 (in applying time limitations, court need not “indulge inefficient use of time by parties or their counsel”).