Cited by

See, e.g., Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145 ¶ 21 (stating that courts should not “defin[e] duties of care in terms of the parties’ actions in particular cases” because “a fact-specific discussion of duty conflates the issue with the concepts of breach and causation”); (defining standard of care as “[w]hat the defendant must do or must not do .

Breach ¶13 Breach is a factual matter typically determined by the jury, Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 9, but summary judgment on breach is appropriate when the evidence is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact whether the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care

See Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 10 ().

turning into Maricopa County’s roadways from other jurisdictions.” (stating 3 VILLALOBOS, et al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al. Decision of the Court that the duty to maintain reasonably safe roads extends to “those who use the public streets”).

“[I]n negligence cases, the duty if it exists is always the same—to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.” (brackets omitted) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984)).

Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357; (affirming summary judgment in roadway case, reasoning that the city “is not bound to provide perfect intersections or streets, but only those which are ‘reasonably safe’”).

I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶19 A municipality “is not bound to provide perfect intersections or streets, but only those which are ‘reasonably safe.’”

A negligence claim requires either “an act” or a failure to “act.” See Restatement § 284; (citing Restatement § 284 with approval).

Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 144 ¶¶ 16–17 (causation); Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357 (standard of care); (standard of care).

Whether a defendant has exercised the care required to satisfy its duty is generally a question of fact for the jury, but a court may rule as a matter of law when “no reasonable juror could conclude that the standard of care was breached.” Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 9 n.1 ; see also Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357; -54 (1984).

-54, -82 (1984) (concluding city’s failure to remove bush that partially obstructed view of road did not violate duty of care).

(quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 42, at 325-26 (4th ed.1971)); , (describing “duty” as “the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other” ( , )).

¶15 P.2d 281 (1969), -52, -80 (1984).

See, Ariz. State Highway Dep’t v. Bechtold, City of Phoenix.

210, 212 (D.Ariz.1992); , (stating the concept of “duty” applies to a “relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other”) (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th *458 ed.1984)).

at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, , 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1 (citing Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357-58 , 706 P.2d at 369-70 ; , ); , 402-03 n. 4, , 23-24 n. 4 (App.1991) (noting that, “in approaching the question of negligence or unreasonable risk, ‘the courts set outer limits.

to satisfy the duty.” , (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed.1984)).

¶ 13 “ ‘[D]uty’ is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty [if it exists] is always the same-to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.” , (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed.1984)).

(“assuming], without deciding, that because the city controls both the street and the adjacent land its duty as owner of the lot is coextensive with its duty as the possessor of the abutting streets”).

Our supreme court, however, repeatedly has rejected “attempt[s] to equate the concept of ‘duty’ with such specific details of conduct.” see also Isbell ex rel.

Hafner correctly notes that the question is whether there is a “ ‘relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other.’ ” 185 Ariz. at 392 , 916 P.2d at 1108 .

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “we look at whether sufficient evidence of foreseeability and possible prevention was presented to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 211 , 941 P.2d at 223 ; , (summary judgment proper if insufficient evidence of breach of duty).