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Whether Lerch received “ineffective assistance [of counsel] is a mixed question of fact and law.” ¶ 6 (App. 2013).

Whether counsel was ineffective “is a mixed question of fact and law,” and so we “defer to the trial court’s factual findings but review de novo the ultimate conclusion.” ¶ 6 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

Under the first prong, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

“To overcome this presumption, [Vigorito is] required to show counsel’s decisions were not tactical in nature, but were instead the result of ‘ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2013) ().

“Strategic decisions are ‘conscious, reasonably informed decision[s] made by an attorney with an eye to benefitting his client.’” ¶ 9 (App. 2018) ( ¶ 11 (App. 2013)).

Under the first prong, “we must presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

¶ 6 (App. 2013) (Both the prejudice and performance prongs of an IAC claim are mixed questions of law and fact.).

– 48, ¶ 22 (App. 2013); see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (defendant must support claim of actual innocence “with new reliable evidence— whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.”).

See Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 409, ¶ 17 (counsel was not objectively unreasonable when alternative theories were investigated); ¶ 12 (App. 2013).

¶ 12 (App. 2013) (“A purportedly strategic decision is not objectively reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.” (quotation omitted)).

at 407 ¶ 8 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); ¶ 6 (App. 2013)).

¶ 11 (App. 2013) (“[C]ounsel may opt not to pursue a particular investigative path” that is “unnecessary in light of counsel’s chosen trial strategy.”).

at 691; ¶ 11 (App. 2013) ("[A]lthough counsel has a duty to engage in adequate investigation of possible defenses, counsel may opt not to pursue a particular investigative path based on his or her reasoned conclusion that it would not yield useful information or is otherwise unnecessary in light of counsel's chosen stra

We presume counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that might be considered trial strategy, and it is a defendant’s burden “to show counsel’s decisions were not tactical in nature.” ¶ 7 (App. 2013).

Counsel failed to meet her “duty to engage in adequate investigation of possible defenses,” ¶ 11 (App. 2013), and Cooper demonstrated the failure “resulted in not presenting evidence or interposing a defense which would have made a crucial difference to the case at the trial,”

To overcome this presumption, the defendant must show that “counsel’s decisions were not tactical in nature, but were instead the result of ‘ineptitude, inexperience or lack preparation.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION ¶11 Whether Samuels’s attorney “rendered ineffective assistance is a mixed question of fact and law.” ¶ 6 (App. 2013).

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); ¶ 6 (App. 2013).

6 ¶ 4 (2017) (–44, ¶ 6 (App. 2013)).

“To overcome this presumption,” a petitioner must show that “counsel’s decisions were not tactical in nature, but instead were the result of ‘ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation.’” ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).