Cited by

([A]dmission of an accused’s spontaneous, voluntary statement that is not made in response to police interrogation does not violate the defendant’s Miranda rights.”).

(“If a person is subjected to custodial interrogation and indicates a desire that interrogation cease or otherwise invokes his right to remain silent, this decision must be scrupulously honored by the police.”) (emphasis added).

¶49 “In order to be admissible, statements obtained while an accused is subject to custodial interrogation require a prior waiver of Miranda rights.”

See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

(noting that being told one is not under arrest weighs against a finding of custody); (same).

impeach the credibility of the information in the affidavit.”

“[A]dmission of an accused’s spontaneous, voluntary statement that is not made in response to police interrogation does not violate the defendant’s Miranda rights.”

§ 13-3913; (finding probable cause established “if a reasonably prudent person, based upon the facts known by the [affiant], would be justified in concluding the items sought are connected with the criminal activity and that they would be found at the place to be searched”).

-09 (1985) (adding deliberately or recklessly omitted material facts with the intent to mislead the magistrate to the Franks analysis); ¶ 27 (App. 2014).

¶14 Under Franks, "a defendant may challenge the truthfulness of the factual statements in an affidavit supporting a warrant," and may contest any "deliberate or reckless omissions of facts that tend to mislead," ¶ 27 (2014) (quotation omitted).

“Probable cause to conduct a search exists when ‘a reasonably prudent person, based upon the facts known by the officer, would be justified in concluding that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and that they would be found at the place to be searched.’” ().

(“serious doubts” can be shown by “obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports”).

–44, –75 (1997) (holding that forty-five minute Terry detention was reasonable under circumstances); see also Cruz- Mata, 138 Ariz. at 373, 674 P.2d at 1371 (holding that interrogation in police station for one and one-half hours did not amount to Miranda custody); (holding interrogation at police station for approximately one hour before Miranda warnings were provided did not amount to custody or coercive environment).

at 554–55, 557–58, 810 P.2d at 182–83, 185–86 (noting that “omissions are material where there is a substantial possibility that the omitted facts would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause determination”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); –10, –97 (1985).

“An officer has probable cause to conduct a search if a reasonably prudent person, based upon the facts known by the officer, would be justified in concluding that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and that they would be found at the place to be searched.”

Probable Cause ¶ 8 “Probable cause to conduct a search exists when ‘a reasonably prudent person, based upon the facts known by the officer, would be justified in concluding that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and that they would be found at the place to be searched.’ ”

See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002) (“The Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”); - 06, -93 (1985) (absence of handcuffs or demonstration of force supports determination defendant was not in custody).

B. Sufficiency of Probable Cause ¶38 Having concluded Frimmel made a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavits contained recklessly false statements or omissions, we next address whether “the remaining content of the affidavit[s] is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.”