Cited by

Co., (“[T]he balancing of factors under [ARE] 403 is peculiarly a function of trial courts, not appellate courts.”), and we will not disturb the court’s ruling unless “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004) (citation omitted).

¶ 40 (2004) (“We will 17 This was not a question about a “long criminal record” followed by an immediate objection by the defense, –21 (1979).

An abuse of discretion occurs if “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004) (citation omitted).

The purpose of Rule 15.1 is “to give full notification of each side’s case-in- chief so as to avoid unnecessary delay and surprise at trial.” ¶ 38 (2004) ().

Snow- Ingram has not shown “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004); (“The choice of .

¶18 Because “[a] witness should be precluded only as a last resort,” (citation omitted), the court also acted within its discretion in denying the only requested relief—striking Romanski’s rebuttal testimony, –54, ¶¶ 40–41 (2004) (stating the superior court “should seek 5 STATE v. MALERBA Decision of the Court to apply sanctions that affect the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible, since the

Because we cannot say that “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances,” ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)), we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibits 957, 958, and 959.

Mental Health No. MH2009-002120, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (“We generally do not consider issues, even constitutional issues, argued for the first time on appeal.”); n.7 ¶ 59 (2004) (stating that the invited error doctrine exists to prevent a party from injecting error into the record and then profiting from that error on appeal); In re MH–1140–6–93, (finding alleged due process violations were waived as arguments because they were raised for th

Roque, 213 Ariz. at 205 ¶ 21(2006) (–54 ¶ 40 (2004)).

¶ 43, supplemented, (finding a delayed disclosure caused no prejudice due to, in part, the witness’s inclusion as a codefendant on the defendant’s indictment).

An abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004).

An abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004).

¶ 40 (2004) (noting an abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances”).

Thus, no “reasonable likelihood exists that [these comments] could have affected the jury’s verdict.” See Bocharski, 218 Ariz. at 491, ¶ 74 (quoting Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 340, ¶ 45); ¶ 60 (2004) (no misconduct when actions occurred outside the presence of the jury).

(superior court has broad discretion in determining if reasonable grounds exist and such determination is upheld absent a “manifest abuse of discretion.”); ¶ 40 (2004) (abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.”).

¶ 40 (2004) (explaining an abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances”).

See Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 13 (App. 2016); see also Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –88, ¶ 14 (2019) (recognizing that a court’s authority to accelerate a termination hearing is discretionary); ¶ 40 (2004) (“We will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

The trial court abuses its discretion when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

P. 15.7(c); ¶ 38 (2004).

See id.; ¶ 40 (2004) (abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances”).

The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the “record alone,” rather than the performance of defense counsel, “led to [Tran’s] aggravated sentence.” ¶ 40 (2004) (“We will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.”).

The superior court abuses its discretion in ruling on a motion for a discovery sanction "only when 'no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.'" ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

An abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 40 (2004).

¶ 64 (2004) (concluding that the prosecutor’s “acrimonious and inappropriate remarks” occurred outside the jury’s presence and therefore did not violate defendant’s “rights essential to [his] defense”).

We will find an abuse of discretion for a discovery violation only when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” ¶ 29 (2014) ( ¶ 40 (2004)).

¶ 61 (2004), supplemented