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“(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ 3 STATE v. JOHNSON Decision of the Court attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

¶11 When considering whether a mistrial is appropriate based on a witness’s testimony, a court determines “(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

of the Court ¶18 In granting a motion for a mistrial based on witness testimony, the superior court must consider two factors: “(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

See, ¶ 86 (2014); ¶ 65 (2009); –41, ¶¶ 49–50 (2003) (collecting cases).

(a request to waive counsel must be made before empanelment of jury).

This is because the defendant’s right must be considered along with victims’ constitutional rights and “the trial court’s prerogative to control its own docket.” ¶ 27 (2003); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(10).

The superior court must consider two factors when determining whether to grant a mistrial based on witness testimony: (1) “whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention” evidence they could not consider “in reaching their verdict” and (2) “the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003) (citation omitted).

When the superior court sustains an objection to witness testimony, two factors guide whether a mistrial is required: “whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in reaching their verdict” and “the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

To that end, “[a] 13 STATE v. LOPEZ Decision of the Court prosecutor must not convey his personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” ¶ 54 (2003) (citation omitted), or “a defendant’s guilt or innocence,”

¶ 43 (2003); see Payne, 233 Ariz. at 518, ¶ 151 (presuming jurors follow the court's instructions).

A self-representation request is considered timely if it is made “before the jury is empaneled.” ¶ 22 (2003).

“The trial court must consider two factors in determining whether to grant a motion for a mistrial based on a witness’s testimony: (1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

¶11 The superior court considers two factors in deciding whether to grant a mistrial based on a witness’s testimony: “(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003) ().

¶11 For an accused to exercise his constitutional right to proceed without counsel and represent himself, he “must voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to counsel and make an unequivocal and timely request to proceed pro se.”

Although “[t]he right to counsel under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions includes an accused’s right to proceed without counsel and represent himself,” ¶ 22 (2003), that right is contingent on the defendant being “able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol,” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984); ¶ 44 (2017) (“Self-representation may be revoked if a defendant fails to comply with c

When a motion for mistrial is based on witness testimony, the trial court must consider (1) “whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

404(b) (prohibiting the introduction of other bad acts into evidence absent a specific exception); ¶ 40 (2003) (describing requirements for mistrial based on improper witness testimony).

¶9 “The right to counsel under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions includes an accused’s right to proceed without counsel and represent himself.” ¶ 22 (2003).

¶27 The superior court must consider two factors when ruling on a motion for a mistrial based on a witness’ testimony: “(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003).

We review the superior court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 61 (2018), reversing only if defendant shows a reasonable likelihood that comments could have affected the jury’s verdict, ¶ 40 (2010), and affording great deference to the superior court, ¶ 40 (2003).

–27 (1990) (concluding the prosecutor’s descriptions of the defendant as a “monster” and “filth” “exceeded the bounds of appropriate closing argument” and constituted misconduct); ¶ 54 (2003) (explaining a prosecutor should refrain from expressing any personal belief about the credibility of a witness).4 4 Citing the prosecutor’s argument that Dr. Samuels had “trouble” scoring Arias’ tests and inexplicably had rescored her tests, Arias argues the prosecutor impermissibly posed an

Id.; -36, ¶ 22 (2003) (“To exercise [the right to self-representation], a defendant must voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to counsel and make an unequivocal and timely request to proceed pro se.”) ().

In addition, the defendant is required to “make an unequivocal and timely request to proceed pro se.” -36 ¶ 22 (2003).

In deciding whether a mistrial is warranted, the court must consider “(1) whether the testimony called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” ¶ 40 (2003) (citation omitted).

A declaration of mistrial is "the most dramatic remedy for trial error," ¶ 40 (2003) (quotation omitted), and the superior court should grant a mistrial only when a trial error denies the defendant a fair trial

In general, it “is highly inappropriate for a prosecutor to convey his or her personal belief about the credibility of a witness.” Martinez, 230 Ariz. at 215 ¶¶ 29–30 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) ( ¶ 54 (2003)) (addressing a prosecutor making facial expressions which “signaled that the State did not believe the evidence [the defendant] was presenting”).

¶ 40 (2003) (citation omitted).

State v. Lamar , , ¶ 22, quoting Armant v. Marquez , 772 F.2d 552 , 555 (9th Cir. 1985).

¶12 Finally, while a prosecutor cannot “convey his personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” ¶ 54 (2003) (), he may certainly comment on a witness’s bias or prejudice, or lack thereof, see, ¶ 17 (App. 2002)

¶ 45 (2003) (the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor did not engage in intentional misconduct was not “clearly erroneous”); (“Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is limited to a determination whether those findings are clearly erroneous.”)

¶33 A prosecutor should refrain from expressing a “personal belief about the credibility of a witness,” ¶ 54, but may comment on a witness’s 9 STATE v. OGLE Decision of the Court credibility when the “remarks are based on the facts in evidence.” 556 P.2

-36 ¶ 22, -36 (2003) (acknowledging a defendant’s right to self- representation under the Arizona Constitution as beginning before the jury is empaneled); ¶ 1, (recognizing a defendant’s right to self-representation on appeal

¶ 40 (2003) (citation omitted).

¶ 45, supplemented by P.3d 611 (2005) (noting that we will reverse a trial court’s finding of fact that the prosecutor’s actions were not intentional if it is clearly erroneous).

“Whether denying a continuance violates a defendant’s constitutional rights depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” ¶ 28

We give the trial court “great deference” because it “is in the best position to determine whether the [alleged error] will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 40, ( ¶ 32, ).

-37, ¶ 27 (2003), which reasoned that "an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the defendant's constitutional right to self-representation."

¶12 “The right to counsel under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions includes an accused’s right to proceed without counsel and represent himself,” ¶ 22, 72 3Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

Pursuant to the Court’s May 9, 2013 in court discussion with the defendant and the minute entry generated from that hearing, P.3d 831 (2003), the defendant has had more than sufficient time to prepare for trial and a continuance of the trial is not justified.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 821 (1975) (stating self-representation is “part of the ‘due process of law’ that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment” and the Sixth Amendment “implies a right of self-representation”); –36, ¶ 22, –36 (2003).

“A declaration of mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error and is appropriate only when justice will be thwarted if the current jury is allowed to consider the case.” ¶ 40, (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We give “great deference” to a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a mistrial because the trial court is in “the best position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 40, ( ¶ 32, ).

See, ¶ 52, (finding a prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by introducing evidence that a witness agreed to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea agreement).