Cited by

P. 12.9, 13.5(e), 16.1(b); -36, ¶¶ 16-17, -78 (2005) (“We require pretrial objections to an indictment in order to allow correction of any alleged defects before trial begins.”); -40, ¶ 31, -35 (2004) (“[A]ll challenges to a grand jury’s findings of probable cause must be made by motion followed by special action before trial; they are not reviewable on appeal.”).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 145, (internal quotations omitted).

¶22 To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury‟s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” ¶ 145, (citation omitted).

n.9, ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (“Merely mentioning an argument is not enough[.]”).

.” n.9, ¶ 101, n.9 (2004).

n.9 ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (noting failure to assert an argument in an opening brief on appeal “usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim”); ¶ 15

without the [video], ‘there likely would have been no jury submissible case against Krone.’” ¶ 115, (quoting Krone, 182 Ariz. at 322, 897 P.2d at 624).

¶ 120, (“[I]f evidence is objected to on one ground in the trial court and admitted over that objection, other grounds raised for the first time on appeal are waived.”); (“absent 7 Dr. Stephen Brown, who performed

n.9, ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) (failure to present “significant arguments, supported by authority” in opening brief waives issue) ( ).

The State, however, need not prove a juror’s bias with “unmistakable clarity.” ¶ 88

“Merely mentioning an argument is not enough.” ¶ 101, n.9

We review the court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, to the extent it involves a discretionary issue, and we consequently defer to any factual findings that are supported by the record.

The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions for a mistrial, and we review the court’s denial of a motion for an abuse of discretion, State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 124

A voluntary-act instruction is appropriate only if reasonable evidence “support[s] a finding of a lack of a voluntary act.” State v. Almaguer, 661 Ariz. Adv.

-50 ¶ 85, -45 (2004); State v. Cañez (Cañez I), ¶ 30

439-40 ¶ 31, -35 (2004); , 426 ¶ 9

(party entitled to instruction on any theory of case reasonably supported by evidence); ¶¶ 200-01, (no abuse of discretion in court’s refusal to give voluntary-act instruction where defendant presented no testimony suggesting his actions not performed “consciously and as a result of effort and determination”).

¶54 A trial judge must instruct the jury “on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 197

(original conviction nullified when case reversed for reason other than insufficient evidence).

¶ 101 n. 9, (opening brief must present significant arguments supported by authority, otherwise the party abandons and waives the claim) ( , ).

And, because the prohibition against double jeopardy “‘forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding,’” the state would be barred from retrying him.