Cited by

435 n. 1, , 1130 n. 1 (2004).

452 n. 9, ¶ 101, , 1147 n. 9 (2004); ¶ 12 , (holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney).

452 n. 9, ¶ 101, , 1147 n. 9 (2004) (failure to develop argument usually results in abandonment and waiver of issue).

¶ 226, (holding that the (F)(6) aggravator was not established beyond a reasonable doubt when “evidence was presented that [the defendant] was in a ‘dissociated state’ due to psychosis”) (emphasis ad

n. 9, ¶ 101 , , 1147 n. 9 (2004).

(“Although the trial court’s [decision] ...

(“In determining whether reasonable grounds exist [for full Rule 11 evaluations], a judge may rely, among other factors, on his own observations of the defendant‟s demeanor and ability to answer questions.”).

("In determining whether reasonable grounds exist [for full Rule 11 evaluations], a judge may rely, among other factors, on his own observations of the defendant's demeanor and ability to answer questions.”).

o attenuated as to dissipate the taint.‟” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963), quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); (suppression required only when “causal connection exists between a constitutional violation and the government‟s obtaining of [the] evidence”); n.6, n.6 (2004) (applying federal exclusionary-rule principles to violation of Rule 6.1 right to counsel).

Moreover, “a conviction precludes review of the finding of probable cause made by a grand jury.” n.3 ¶ 31, n.3 (2004).

¶ 34 Absent fundamental error, “ ‘if evidence is objected to on one ground in the trial court and admitted over that objection, other grounds raised for the first time on appeal are waived.’ ” ¶ 120 , ( , ); , (finding failure to object to an offer of evidence waives any complaint on appeal absent fundamental error).

452 n. 9, , 1147 n. 9 (2004).

Because we presume the court knew and correctly followed the law in conducting the bench trial, , we find the evidence was sufficient to support Henry's present conviction.

see also Scott, 437 U.S. at 90-91 (“venerable principle of 7 For this reason, we are not persuaded by Szpyrka’s characterization of the state’s petition for review as a cross-appeal requesting the plea be vacated.

Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 340, ¶44 , 111 P.3d at 382 ; ¶ 111 , 94 P,3d 1119, 1148 (2004); State v. Leyvas, 221 Áriz.

n. 9, ¶ 101 , 94 * n. 9 (2004) (failure to develop argument on appeal usually results in abandonment and waiver of issue).

P. 31.13(c)(vi) (appellant’s brief must contain argument with citations to authority); n. 9 , , 1147 n. 9 (2004) (" '[OJpening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an appellant’s position on the issues raised.’ ”)

disapproved of on other grounds by Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct.

200 Ariz. at 565-66, ¶ 9 , 30 P.3d at 632-33 ; ¶ 111 , (“This court has long held that ‘a defendant who invited error at trial may not then assign the same as error on appeal.’” (-23 , -54 (1973))).