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¶91 Morgan stands for the proposition that “defendants are entitled to discover through voir dire ‘whether a potential juror will automatically impose the death penalty once guilt is found.’” ¶ 21 (2013) ( ¶ 27 (2000)).

But neither constitution “requires that a trial be held within a specified time period.” ¶ 9 (2013) (“There is no bright line rule for how quickly a trial must occur.”).

On the contrary, “courts regularly admit business records even when the testifying witness did not assemble the complete record.” ¶ 33 (2013) (citing with approval United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2011), which found that the proponent of bank records properly laid foundation for admission through its proffered custodial witness despite the witness “not hav[ing] personal knowledge of each of the records[.]”).

¶ 78 (2013); (“Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial judge’s determination that a new trial for newly discovered evidence is not necessary.”).

P. 24.2(A)(2), 32.1(e); ¶ 78 (2013).

See Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 222 ¶ 109; ¶ 65 (2013); –98 (1998).

¶ 61 (2013) (finding a party precluded from challenging admissibility of evidence on appeal after stipulating to its admission).

There is sufficient evidence if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 70 (2013) (citation omitted).

Our role is to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 3 STATE v. AGUILAR SANCHEZ Decision of the Court doubt.” ¶ 70 (2013) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Our role is to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 70 (2013) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

“We review the trial court’s decision to give a flight instruction for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 44 (2013).

¶ 61 (2013) (citations omitted).

¶79 “The business records exception requires that the record be made at or near the time of the entry by or from information transmitted by someone with knowledge, be kept in the ordinary course of business, be made as a regular practice, and be testified to by a qualified witness.” ¶ 28 (2012); Ariz. R. Evid.

He contends that “nothing in the record indicat[es]” he “may have taken flight or concealed evidence.” “We review the trial court’s decision to give a flight instruction for abuse of discretion.”

Evidence is sufficient to support denying a Rule 20 motion if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 70 (2013).

(finding a party precluded from challenging admissibility of evidence on appeal after stipulating to its admission).

¶ 50 (2013) (stating that defendant’s “explanation for his flight did not preclude the trial court from giving a flight instruction” but “simply created a fact question for the jury to decide”).

¶ 54 (2013) ("A trial judge must instruct the jury 'on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.'" ( ¶ 197 (2004))).

Put another way, the superior court cannot admit “out of court testimonial evidence unless the defense has had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” ¶ 38 (2013) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).

“A motion for new trial should be granted ‘only if the evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.’” ¶ 74 (2013) ().

See State v. (Robert) Hernandez, ¶ 57 (2013) (“While bound, [the victim] would have been uncertain as to her fate, and thus suffered the requisite mental anguish necessary for the ‘especially cruel’ finding required by § 13-751(F)(6).” (internal citation omitted)); ¶ 88 (2013) (“[T]hat [the victim] was bound supports a finding that she was conscious, and so would have suffered mental anguish.”); Gallardo, 225 Ariz. at 565–66 ¶ 17 (“[The victim] almost certainly was conscious when bound, as there