Cited by

The intrinsic evidence doctrine applies to acts that are “so closely related to the charged act that they cannot fairly be considered other acts, but rather are part of the charged act itself.” ¶ 14 (2012) (cleaned up).

¶12 to argue that evidence of 5 STATE v. MORENO Opinion of the Court one charge cannot be classified as an “other” act in relation to a separate charge within the same ind

When other-act evidence is offered for a permissible purpose, “it may be admissible under Rule 404(b), subject to Rule 402’s general relevance test, Rule 403’s balancing test, and Rule 105’s requirement for limiting instructions.” ¶ 12 (2012).

See, -12, ¶¶ 9-10 (App. 1998) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting recording of 8-year-old victim’s police interview because victim’s trial testimony about her “diminished” memory satisfied Rule 803(5))

¶17 The intrinsic evidence doctrine’s “premise is that certain acts are so closely related to the charged act that they cannot fairly be considered ‘other’ acts, but rather are part of the charged act itself.” ¶ 14 (2012) (citation omitted).

are part of the charged act itself.” ¶ 14 (2012).

Such evidence may be relevant for a non-propensity purpose such as to provide “background” by “allowing the jury to hear the full story of the crime.” ¶ 23 (2012) (quoting United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2010)).

¶ 42 (2001), ¶ 20 (2012).

¶21 “[E]vidence is intrinsic in Arizona if it (1) directly proves the charged act, or (2) is performed contemporaneously with and directly facilitates commission of the charged act.” ¶ 20 (2012).

4 STATE v. JOHNSON Decision of the Court ¶14 An amendment to an indictment is permitted if it “does not change the nature of the offense charged or prejudice the defendant in any way.” ¶ 11 (2012).

-42 (App. 1983); (explaining that a jury’s guilty verdict makes any error in the charging decision harmless), ¶ 25 (2001), -43, ¶¶ 14-20 (2012).

¶ 23 (2012) (courts must grant a request to give a limiting instruction when other-act evidence has been admitted).

(concluding that erroneous admission of hearsay evidence that was cumulative to other evidence was harmless)

See § 13-1410; (date of offense not element of sexual assault), Jones, 792 P.2d at 655, 657 (specific date, time, place, or circumstances not elements of molestation and prosecution utilizing generic testimony does not, of itself, violate due process because sufficient notice generally provided by pretrial disclosure, including preliminary hearing or grand jury transcripts

Before admitting evidence under Rule 404(c), the court must find that “[t]he evidentiary value of proof of the other act is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or other factors mentioned in Rule 403.” Rule 404(c)(1)(C); ¶ 11 (2012) (when evidence of a prior similar sex offense committed against the same child is offered to prove a defendant’s aberrant propensity to commit the charged sexual offense, “the evidence must be screened under Rule 404(c)” be

“[M]ercy is not a mitigating circumstance” but is a “concept jurors may apply in evaluating the existence of mitigating circumstances.” ¶¶ 47–49 (2007)

]ven if a defendant does not contest certain issues, photographs are still admissible if relevant because the ‘burden to prove every element of a crime is not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense.’” (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991)), (“While it may be true that the subject-matter of a photograph can be described adequately 5 STATE v. GIEBEL Decision of the Court with words, that is not

Evidence is intrinsic if it “directly proves the charged act” or “is performed contemporaneously with and directly facilitates commission of the charged act.” ¶ 20 (2012).

¶ 67 (2007) (rejecting the same argument), ¶ 20 (2012).