Cited by

IV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8, and “any evidence collected in violation” of these provisions “is generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial,” ¶ 10 (2016).

IV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8; ¶ 10 (2016).

¶ 1 (2016); see also Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250–51 (“[W]e have long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.”).

See State v. Cañez, ¶ 61 (2002), –03, ¶ 11, n.1 (2016) (“[I]t would require a rare case for the defendant’s own statement to be seen as prejudicial to the extent it should be excluded under Rule 403.”).

This court “review[s] the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion, considering the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016).

g had a reasonable privacy expectation in his laptop but argues there was no constitutional violation because the school employees were not state actors.3 We review the superior court’s order denying the motion to suppress for abuse of discretion and view “the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling.” ¶ 5 (2019) ( ¶ 9 (2016)).

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, “considering the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling.”

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); ¶ 10 (2016).

-03, ¶¶ 1, 11 (2016) (explaining that “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free and voluntary consent to search,” which “[t]he [S]tate must prove by a preponderance of the evidence”).

ng, ¶¶ 63–64, supplemented, ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s “implicit[] finding” under step three in 18 STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court denying the Batson challenge)

¶ 10 (2016); see U.S. Const. amend.

¶ 51 (2002) (reviewing suppression issue first raised on appeal for fundamental error), ¶ 11, n.1 (2016).

See, ¶ 48 (2002) (finding identification made within two days of the crime weighed in favor of reliability), superseded on other grounds, –55 (1987) (concluding there was no error in admitting identification where the “time between the crime and the identification was but a few hours”); –32 (1985) (finding an identification made “fifty-three days after the crime” was not unrelia

against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and “any evidence collected in violation of [the same] is generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial.” ¶ 10 (2016).

To be sure, the trial “court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it,” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347, and, in Arizona, may even conduct the entire step-three analysis implicitly in some cases, ¶ 28 (2002), 2 But in other cases, express findings are essential.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); ¶ 10 (2016).

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51 (1991); ¶ 11 (2016).

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654- 55 (1961); ¶ 10 (2016).

¶ 25 (2016); ¶ 11 (App. 2004).

State v. Valenzuela , , ¶ 31

P. 16.2(b) n.1, ¶ 11 (2016).

State v. Valenzuela , , 302, ¶ 9, , 630 (2016).

(“Valenzuela II”), the officer here did not tell De Anda he was required to submit to the test, and the officer’s identifying the consequences of refusal before asking whether he would submit to the testing did not in itself render De Anda’s consent involuntary.

BERNINI/STATE Opinion of the Court well-established exceptions [to the warrant requirement] applies.” State v. Valenzuela (Valenzuela II), ¶ 10 (2016) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)).