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¶ 9 (2016); see also State v. Sandoval Beltran, 1 CA-CR 23-0142, 2024 WL 1930995, at *2, ¶ 10 n.2 (Ariz. App. May 2, 2024) (mem.

This court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, deferring to the “court's factual findings if reasonably supported by the evidence,” but reviewing the court’s “ultimate legal determination de novo.” ¶ 9 (2019).

¶ 9 4 STATE v. SANDOVAL BELTRAN Decision of the Court (2016).2 Stated differently, to be consistent with both lines of precedent, we conduct an independent review of the video evidence, Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 111, ¶ 12, but w

And while we defer to the superior court’s factual findings, so long as they are “reasonably supported by the evidence,” ¶ 9 (App. 2016), we cannot say, considered in the aggregate, that the factors identified by the court rise to objective reasonable suspicion.

W I L L I A M S, Judge, dissenting: ¶26 The majority summarizes nicely the facts in the record before us, and accurately notes, supra ¶ 12, that this court gives “deference to the superior court’s factual findings,” so long, of course, as they are “reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 9 (2016).

This court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, deferring to the “court’s factual findings if reasonably supported by the evidence,” but reviewing the court’s “ultimate legal determination de novo.” ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

DISCUSSION ¶6 We review a superior court decision on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion, “considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling,” but we review the court’s “ultimate legal determination de novo.” ¶ 9 (2016).

¶¶ 23–25 (2016), to determine whether the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and thus constitutionally permissible.

3.8.” ¶8 This court “review[s] a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016) ( ¶ 8 (2013)).

DISCUSSION ¶7 This court reviews “a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s rulings.” ¶ 9 (2016) ( ¶ 8 (2013)).

He also contended, in the alternative, that the search was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances, citing State v. Adair

¶ 9 (2016); ¶ 7 (App. 6 STATE v. GARCIA Decision of the Court 2000) ("Whether a person has been seized by police is a mixed question of law and fact.").

DISCUSSION ¶13 As directed by the Arizona Supreme Court, this court “review[s] a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016) ( ¶ 8 (2013)).

STATE v. DENNIS Decision of the Court 60, ¶ 9 (2016).

¶7 “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016).

47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)) (“[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is reasonableness.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); ¶ 1 (2016) (warrantless search of probationer’s residence “complies with the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances”).

erred in denying his motion to suppress challenging the legality of the stop and search that led to the discovery of marijuana.1 ¶6 “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” ¶ 9 (2016).