Cited by

(right to counsel at critical stages) (citations omitted); (right to be present at critical stages).

(right to counsel at critical stages) (citations omitted); (right to be present at critical stages).

P. 27.8(b)(2) (right to be present at violation hearing); (right to counsel at critical stages) (citations omitted); (right to be present at critical stages).

See, (right to counsel) (citations omitted); (right to be present).

(right to counsel at critical stages) (citations omitted); (right to be present at critical stages).

See, (right to counsel) (citations omitted); (right to be present).

(right to counsel at critical stages) (citations omitted); (right to be present at critical stages).

(right to counsel at critical stages) (citations omitted); (right to be present at critical stages).

The right to counsel attaches at “every critical stage of criminal proceedings”; that is, every stage at which “‘substantial rights of the accused may be affected.’” quoting Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).

(holding that, “by choosing not to testify, Gonzales waived his right to claim that the trial court erroneously ruled involuntary statements admissible to impeach”); (holding that, because the defendant did not testify, “he may not attack the pretrial ruling conditionally admitting his statements [obtained in violation of Miranda] for impeachment in the event he did testify”).

¶25 Implicitly acknowledging that IAC claims against trial counsel were previously raised and are now precluded, 6 that, in general, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were raised or could have been rai

(noting that judicial economy is served by avoiding “piecemeal litigation” of ineffective representation claims); (same).3 3 Similarly, if ineffective assistance of counsel claims are considered before trial and the defendant is successful in obtaining reinstatement of a lapsed plea offer, the State’s only relief (as here) would be through an interlocutory appellate special action.

_______________ ruling allowing use of prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes); -03, -54 (1990) (holding that defendant who did not testify at trial waived any challenge to a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of his statements to police for impeachment purposes).

The rationale behind the rule is that “[wjithout defendant’s testimony, a reviewing court cannot properly weigh the probative value of the testimony against the impact of the impeachment.” , *96 (1990).

See, (“We hold that by choosing not to testify, Gonzales waived his right to claim that the trial court erroneously ruled involuntary statements 9 admissible to impeach.”); -03, -54 (1990).

(“This provision makes any defects harmless error unless timely raised under Rule 16.”) B. Defective Verdict Forms It is also well established that Appellant cannot object to the forms of verdict for the first time on appeal unless the error was “fundamental.” , , ; see also Rule 21.3(c) (party who fails to object to verdict forms waives the error on appeal).

A “critical stage” is one at which “substantial rights of the accused may be affected.” , Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 , 88 S.Ct.

we held that by choosing not to testify, a defendant waives his right to challenge the court’s pretrial ruling that statements made in violation of Miranda would be admissible to impeach.

For example, , the defendant raised ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing in a post-conviction relief proceeding.

our supreme court held that a defendant whose confession without Miranda warnings was ruled admissible for impeachment could not challenge that ruling because he did not testify.

(defendant entitled to assistance of counsel at every critical stage of criminal proceedings); , (person is always entitled to assistance of an attorney, whether in custody or not); rule 6.1(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.