Cited by

¶ 118 (2024) (sufficiency of the evidence); (sufficiency of the evidence); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 595 (motion for judgment of acquittal); 392 (1962) (motion for new trial); ¶ 2 (App. 1998) (suppression rulings).

Although a defendant has the right to a fair and impartial jury, “he is not entitled to be tried by any particular jury.”

¶39 An appellate court “will not disturb [a] trial court’s ruling on any evidentiary issue absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted).

In other words, the cumulative error must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Robinson, (reversal requires conduct that “permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial” ()).

(noting that the threat of a search warrant would not "render [the] defendant's consent involuntary"); United States v. Talkington, 843 F.2d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that when considered in the totality of the circumstances, a defendant's consent may be free and voluntary despite the threat to ob

(“If an ineffectiveness claim can be rejected for lack of prejudice, the court need not inquire into counsel’s performance.” (citation omitted)).

-42 (App. 1983); (explaining that a jury’s guilty verdict makes any error in the charging decision harmless), ¶ 25 (2001), -43, ¶¶ 14-20 (2012).

6 STATE v. ETIENNE Decision of the Court “Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), ¶ 25 (2001); accord Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616.

disapproved of on other grounds, ¶ 25 (2001); 461 (1985) (analyzing attorney’s “failure to argue for petitioner’s alleged intoxication” as trial strategy); (attorney’s decisio

That being said, when a defendant demonstrates that trial publicity “was so extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a ‘carnival-like atmosphere,’” we “presume prejudice without a particularized examination of the publicity’s effect on the jury.” ( ¶ 25 (2001)).

–87 (App. 1993) (–97 (1992), ¶ 25 (2001)).

“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 26 ( ¶ 25 (2001)).

We reverse for insufficient evidence only if there is a “complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction.” ¶ 25 (2001).

To meet this standard, Gorla must demonstrate the State acted in an intentionally improper or prejudicial manner, ¶ 22 (App. 2014), so “pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial,”

Cumulative Misconduct ¶103 Sanders has failed to show that any misconduct “permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 79 ¶ 26 (quoting 27 ).

We will not reverse a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct unless the conduct is “so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” ().

the 'media coverage [must be] so extensive or outrageous that it permeate[s] the proceedings or create[s] a 'carnival-like' atmosphere,' " Cruz , 218 Ariz. at 157 ¶ 15, 181 P.3d at 204 (quoting State v. Atwood , , 631, , 648 (1992) ), devoid of the "fundamental and essential element[s] of ...

¶ 11 (2017) (reviewing motion to suppress) ( ¶ 8 (2013)); n.1, ¶ 1 (App. 2000) (reviewing jury instructions) ().

–05 (1992), ¶ 25 (2001).