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Opinions formed “on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)) (emphasis added).

Torres, 208 Ariz. at 344-45, ¶¶ 15, 17 (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is a separate issue that can be raised only in a proceeding for post-conviction relief.”); (holding disagreements over “tactical decisions” that “raise concerns about attorney competence .

The requirement for an unequivocal request 5 CHRISTOPHER B. v. MIA D., et al. Decision of the Court to represent oneself acts as a “safety net” to prevent inadvertent waiver when a defendant is “thinking aloud about the benefits and pitfalls of self- representation.” (citing Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Criminal defendants have “a constitutionally protected right to proceed without counsel,” but “[i]n order to successfully invoke this right, the accused must make an unequivocal request to represent himself.”

See Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 447 ¶ 76, 448 ¶ 84

–77, ¶ 17 (App. 2012) (competent); (citation omitted) (unequivocal); ¶ 8 (2016) (citation omitted) (knowing and voluntary); ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (timely).

The unequivocal request requirement ensures “that a defendant does not inadvertently waive counsel while thinking aloud about the benefits and pitfalls of self- representation,” and also “prevents a defendant from ‘taking advantage of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-representation.’” (citations omitted).

at 186-87, ¶ 29 (-47 (1997))

Opinions formed “on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56.

“Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” (quotation omitted).

¶ 16 Drawing on criminal cases involving the right to counsel, , , the Daniel Y. court observed that the waiver of the right to counsel cannot be “easily presumed.” ¶¶ 15-21 , 77 P.3d at 58-60 .

(“Unlike other factors, the presence of a genuine irreconcilable conflict requires the appointment of new counsel.”); ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (defendant bears burden of establishing severe and pervasive conflict with counsel).

See, ¶ 62, ¶ 56, Dann, 220 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 10, 207 P.3d at 611; ¶ 44, State v. Henry (Henry II), State v. Henry (Henry I)

Furthermore, a trial judge is presumed to be unbiased, and rebutting this presumption requires a party to prove bias or prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.

See, (“When a defendant has repeatedly claimed ‘irreconcilable conflict’ with a series of attorneys, the court may deny a motion for yet another lawyer where the orderly administration of justice so requires.”); (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to remove coun

“Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983)