Cited by

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., n.9 (2005).

that § 1-244 requires an express statement of retroactive intent before a statute will be considered retroactive.”); see also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 16 (2005) (noting “the settled rule” that “absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, an act .

But we may exercise our discretion to consider the merits of a waived argument when a “good reason exists.” City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33 n.9 (2005) (citation omitted).

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 8 (2005).

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., n.9 (2005) (“While we generally will not consider arguments not presented below, this is a rule of prudence, not of jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).

§ 1-213, and we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous,” ¶ 11 (2019) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., –53, ¶¶ 31–34 (2005)).

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., –53 ¶¶ 31–34 (2005); Scalia & Garner, supra, 174 (providing that, under the surplusage canon, every word in a statute must be given effect, and “[n]one should be ignored”).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 17 (2005).

§ 1-213, and we “give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous,” ¶ 11 (2019) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., –53, ¶¶ 31–34 (2005)).

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33 n.9 (2005) (citation omitted).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 17 (2005) (“[C]hanges in modes of procedure do not invalidate completed procedural actions valid under the law in effect at the time they were taken.”).

ial preparation and presentation on evidence showing that the address that Leonard listed on his petition sheets was not his actual residence” and “did not present evidence concerning the 93 signatures containing mismatched addresses, as this would have been superfluous.” ¶42 The rule of waiver “is a rule of prudence, not of jurisdiction.” City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., n.9 (2005).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., (“Whenever possible, we do not interpret statutes in such a manner as to 1The state’s precise interpretation on review is difficult to pin down as it appears internally inconsistent.

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 31 (2005).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 31 (2005) (“[W]e do not interpret statutes in such a manner as to render a clause superfluous.”).

§ 13-921(B)(1), (4) (requiring that, if applicable, a defendant whose conviction is set aside or expunged “shall” nonetheless comply with § 13-3821); see also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 31 (2005).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33 n.9 (2005).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., -49, ¶¶ 11, 17 (2005) (holding new statute of limitations did not apply to claims filed before the express effective date).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33 n.9 (2005) (waiver based on abandonment is “a rule of prudence, not of jurisdiction”).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., –53 ¶¶ 31–34 (2005).

in December 2015 and told her she “was not welcome in his house.” Ariz. 53, 56, ¶ 13 (2017) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., n.9, ¶ 33 (2005)) (decision to deem issue waived is “jurisprudential, not jurisdictional”).

See Marianne N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 13 (2017) (citing City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., n.9, ¶ 33 (2005)) (decision to deem issue waived is “jurisprudential, not jurisdictional”).

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33, n.9 (2005).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., ¶ 33 n.9 (2005).

See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., , 552 ¶ 31, (“Whenever possible, we do not interpret statutes in such a manner as to render a clause superfluous.”).