Cited by

–57, ¶¶ 13–14 (2006) (following Restatement § 4.1(1), cmt.

¶14 Arizona courts interpret CC&Rs so as “to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding the creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.” ¶ 13 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1(1) (2000)); accord Ariz. Biltmore Estates Ass’n v. Tezak

¶ 8 (2006) (“A deed containing a restrictive covenant that runs with the land is a contract.”) We review the interpretation of contracts de novo as a question of law.

Though we generally interpret contracts de novo, –56 ¶ 8 (2006), we are not asked to interpret the parties’ policies.

Andrews, 205 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 12; ¶ 8 (2006) (“A deed containing a restrictive covenant that runs with the land is a contract.”).

“[T]he implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing protects the right of the parties to an agreement to receive the benefits of the agreement that they have entered into.” Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., superseded by statute on other grounds, ¶ 29 (2006).

Our goal in interpreting restrictive covenants is to give effect to the parties’ intention “as determined from the language of the document in its entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created.” 576-77 ¶¶ 1, 13 (2006) (adopting the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.1(1) (2000)).

556-57, ¶¶ 1, 13 (2006) (“[R]estrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the language of the document in its entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created.”) (adopting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.1(1) (2000)).

As with other servitudes, easements “should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.” ¶ 13 (2006) (citation omitted).

As with other servitudes, easements “should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.” ¶ 13 (2006) (citation omitted).

¶19 Plaintiffs contend they cannot be limited purpose public figures because the Board is a private association.

¶ 8 (2006); see also Dreamland Villa Cmty.

CSA 13-101 Loop, 236 Ariz. at 412 ¶ 8; 1800 Ocotillo, 219 Ariz. at 202 ¶ 7; superseded by statute on other grounds, ¶ 29 (2006).

¶13 “[W]hen a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced so as to give effect to the intent of the parties.” ¶ 9 (2006) (citation omitted).

–56 ¶ 8 (2006); ¶ 29 (2015).

WATSON, et al. v. LEISURE WORLD Decision of the Court we read the language in its ordinary sense and read restrictions “in light of the circumstances surrounding [their] formulation, with the idea of carrying out [their] object, purpose and intent.” Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Ass’n v. Orlandini, ¶ 31 (App. 2011) ( ¶ 16 (2006)).

committed fraud, duress, or abuse of economic power.” ¶48 “[A] cause of action in tort is available to a party to any contract, at-will or otherwise, when a third party improperly and intentionally interferes with the performance of that contract.” Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., ¶ 29 (2006).

“[E]nforcing the intent of the parties is the ‘cardinal principle’ in interpreting restrictive covenants.” ¶ 14 (2006) (citation omitted).

Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., ¶ 29 (2006).

¶ 8 (2006) (citations omitted); see also Taylor v. State Farm Mut.

e law to hold that restrictions are not 4 CUNDIFF et al. v. COX Decision of the Court favored and must be strictly construed, but further noting that, at the time of its ruling, the trial court did not have the benefit of our supreme court’s then-recent pronouncement in this area, P.3d 373 (2006)—which rejected the very rule of construction relied on by the trial court—we concluded that “[t]he Coxes’ tree farm is clearly an agricultural business” and “nothing in the Declaration suggests that any