Cited by

¶ 14 (App. 2009) (victim becoming unconscious and drowning after accident was not a superseding cause); ¶ 8 (App. 4 STATE v. CEPEDA Decision of the Court ¶10 Cepeda cites to civil cases -- and Dupray v. JAI Dining Services (Phoenix), Inc., -- arguing that criminal law concerning superseding, intervening cause should require the same type of jury instructions as in civil cases.

damages were proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.” ¶ 9 n.1 (2007).

“The existence of a duty of care is a distinct issue from whether the standard of care has been met in a particular case.” ¶ 10 (2007).

Although causation is generally a question of fact for the jury to resolve, ¶ 9 (2007), the court may resolve the issue if the evidence is insufficient to allow a jury to reasonably infer that “the negligent conduct on the part of the defendant was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” ¶ 23 (App. 2009); see Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 146

¶ 9 (2007) (citation omitted).

Although whether an alleged tortfeasor has breached a duty and caused injury are generally fact issues for a jury to determine, summary judgment is appropriate “if no reasonable juror could conclude that the standard of care was breached or that the damages were proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.” n.1 ¶ 9 (2007).

The elements of negligence, other than the existence of a duty, which is a question of law, are factual issues “generally within the province of the jury.” ¶ 11 (App. 2009); ¶ 10 (2007) (“Whether the defendant has met the standard of care—that is, whether there has been a breach of duty—is an issue of fact that turns on the specifics of the individual case.”).

Second, ¶ 15 (2007), foreseeability is not a factor in determining duty.

A. Negligence Claims ¶8 A plaintiff asserting negligence must prove: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” ¶ 9 (2007) (emphasis added).

Res Ipsa Loquitur/Expert Testimony ¶18 A plaintiff asserting negligence must prove: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” ¶ 9 (2007).

“Duty is defined as an obligation, recognized by law, which requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm.” ¶ 10 (2007) (citations omitted).

¶ 9, (citation omitted).

A. ¶7 Under Arizona law, a plaintiff must prove four elements to sustain a claim for negligence: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” ¶ 9 (2007).

The “builder-vendor” allegations were part of Cetotor’s negligence claim: Cetotor alleged that Teufel was a “builder- vendor” and that “[a]s a builder-vendor, Tefuel [sic] negligently performed or negligently supervised the hillside grading and slope cut.” Negligence, however, does not require that the defendant qualify as a “builder-vendor.” ¶ 9 (2007) (holding that a negligence claim requires proof of a duty to conform to a standard of care, breach of that standard, causal connection between d