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In conducting our review, "we compare the evidence 'against the statutorily required elements of the offense,'" ¶ 22 (App. 2020) ( ¶ 8 (App. 2005)), and do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,"

This Court “does not reweigh the evidence to decide if it would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.”

see Williams, 209 Ariz. at 231, ¶ 6.

Further, in conducting our review, we compare the evidence "against the statutorily required elements of the offense," ¶ 22 (App. 2020) (quoting Pena, 209 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 8), and do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,"

“The substantial evidence required to support a conviction may be direct or circumstantial,” ¶ 40 (App. 2007), and we do not “reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,”

Further, in conducting our review, we compare the evidence "against the statutorily required elements of the offense," ¶ 22 (App. 2020) ( ¶ 8 (App. 2005)), and do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,"

We do not “reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.”

¶ 33 (2002) (error was harmless because the jury made reasoned decisions and acquitted on one of four counts); (harmless error to exclude a statement when the jury acquitted defendant of the charge to which statement would have been relevant); –8 (App. 1977) (not prejudicial error when improperly communicated instruction went to the charge of which defendant was acquitted).

We do not “reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusion as the trier of fact.”

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and “‘do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,’” Borquez, 232 Ariz. at 487 ¶ 9 ().

¶9 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will “not reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” ().

¶9 “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to decide if it would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.”

We do “not reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” (citation omitted).

at 164-65; , (“[W]e express our concern that a junior officer in the executive branch of county government (deputy county attorney) is given great discretion and power to affect sentencing in a state court while denying to the state judicial officer who presides over that court any discretion in