Cited by

¶ 91 (App. 2007) (holding an argument not raised in opening brief waived).

100, ¶¶ 38, 40 (App. 2007) (party preserved argument on appeal when the party reiterated the argument in its motion).

To infer from these documents that Best was acting on BCL’s behest when recording the Notice would require a jury “to pile inference upon inference, which stretches the evidence presented beyond the bounds of circumstantial evidence.” ¶ 52 (App. 2007).

¶ 91 (App. 2007) (concluding an argument not raised in appellant’s opening brief is waived).

¶ 91 (App. 2007) (“We will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief.”).

¶ 91 (App. 2007) (“We will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief.” (citation omitted)); Robert Schalkenbach Found.

¶ 40 (App. 2007) (party had preserved their objection on appeal when the party reiterated his argument to the court).

15 ACCORD TRUCKING, INC. v. FEDEX Decision of the Court ¶ 32 (App. 2007).

¶ 27 (App. 2007) (“[T]o constitute actionable fraud, the false representation must be of a matter or fact which exists in the present, or has existed in the past[.]” ()).

¶19 This court reviews the denial of a motion for JMOL de novo, ¶ 29 (2015), drawing all reasonable inferences and viewing the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, ¶ 25 (App. 2007).

¶ 71 n.21 (App. 2007) (noting, in analogous circumstance, that “the scope of [a party’s] fiduciary duty is a question of law”).

¶ 13 (App. 2000); ¶ 91 (App. 2007); see also ARCAP 13(c).

We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion de novo, ¶ 29 (2015), viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, ¶ 25 (App. 2007).

Courts award prejudgment interest to “recompens[ate] the victim and deter[] defendants from dilatory litigation tactics.” ¶ 99 (App. 2007).

The defendant’s knowledge “may be inferred from the circumstances” and the evidentiary burden “may be satisfied by showing [the defendant’s] general awareness of the primary tortfeasor’s fraudulent scheme.” ¶ 50 (App. 2007).

¶13 While a plaintiff need not allege that an aiding and abetting defendant had “[a]ctual and complete knowledge of the details of a primary tort,” he must allege that “the defendants knew the conduct they allegedly aided and abetted was a tort.” ¶ 50 (App. 2007) (citing Wells Fargo, 201 Ariz. at 485, ¶¶ 33, 35 (2002)).