Cited by

See In re Fillbach, 223 F.3d 1089, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2000)

§ 12-3201(A) (“In a noncriminal case, at the request of a party or on the court’s own motion, the presiding judge of the superior court or a judge designated by the presiding judge of the superior court may designate a pro se litigant a vexatious litigant.”); ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (adopting the principles courts must observe when ordering pre-filing restrictions).

Ordinarily, because the vexatious litigant designation is entered by an administrative order, we would be limited to 2 CONTRERAS v. BOURKE Opinion of the Court special action review.1 n.8 (App. 2012).

¶44 “Arizona courts possess inherent authority to curtail a vexatious litigant’s ability to initiate additional lawsuits.” ¶ 17 (App. 2012).

¶¶ 17-18 (App. 2012); A.R.S.

¶13 Flynn contends his statements about pursuing legal action did not constitute harassment and were not “threats” because “[a]ccess to the courts is a fundamental right.” ¶ 17 (App. 2012).

¶10 “[A]ccess to courts is a fundamental right.” ¶ 17 (App. 2012).

¶ 16 n. 8 (App. 2012); see also Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt.

We treat the court’s order as granting injunctive relief, ¶ 16 n.8 (App. 2012), and review for an abuse of discretion, Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt.

¶ 16 n.8 (App. 2012) (stating this court does not have appellate jurisdiction over administrative passed its savings statute, A.R.S.

¶ 1 (App. 2012) (upholding dismissal of tort claims waived under A.R.S.

Because the part of the superior court’s order designating Eden a vexatious litigant is in effect an order granting an injunction, we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12–2101(A)(5)(b) (2016).1 n.8, ¶ 16 (App. 2012).

ails to enjoin a trustee’s sale waives his claims to title of the property upon the sale’s completion, and also waives any claims that are dependent on the 5 ZUBIA v. SHAPIRO, et al. Opinion of the Court sale.” (citations omitted) (citing BT Capital, LLC, 229 Ariz. at 301 ¶ 10, ¶ 15 (App. 2012))).

n.8, ¶ 16 (App. 2 Willis filed his amended complaint on July 1, 2015.

We grant their request based on the deed of trust and will award a reasonable sum of fees, as well as taxable costs, upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 3 Moreover, § 33-811(C)’s waiver provision applies to trustors who receive notice of a sale in time to seek an injunction, –13, ¶¶ 11–12 (App. 2012), which clearly occurred here.

restrictions on future filings, a court must satisfy due process by (1) affording the party notice and an opportunity to oppose the order; (2) creating an adequate record for appellate review; (3) making substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions; and (4) “narrowly tailor[ing the order] to closely fit the specific vice encountered.” ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (citation omitted).

Co. of Ariz., ¶¶ 9-11 (2012); ¶ 15 (App. 2012).

§ 33–811.C; ¶ 15 (App. 2012) (reasoning that a party waives any challenges to a trustee’s sale, apart from lack of notice of the sale, by failing to obtain injunctive relief prior to the sale).