Cited by

Collins v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cnty., (“A defendant represented by counsel is 3 STATE v. SAYADYAN Decision of the Court usually presumed to have entered his guilty plea voluntarily.”); ¶ 17 n.9 (App. 2017).

¶ 22 (App. 2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2000).

See, ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (noting that a defendant's statements during a plea colloquy are "'solemn declarations'" that "'carry a strong presumption of verity'" and "'constitute a formidable barrier' in a subsequent challenge to the validity of a plea" (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977)).

¶10 “The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” ¶ 14 (App. 2017) (cleaned up); see Ariz. R. Crim.

¶ 22 (App. 2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2000).

To ensure plea agreements remain final, statements made during a plea hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity, and constitute a formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.” ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (cleaned up).

To ensure plea agreements remain final, statements made during a plea hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity, and constitute a formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.” ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (cleaned up).

Although prejudice is a required element of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984), the State has provided no authority that such a showing is required for Petkovic’s PCR claims regarding his English fluency and his comprehension of the plea proceedings, –28, ¶¶ 10–23 (App. 2017) (analyzing a PCR petitioner’s claims that his plea was involuntary and his counsel was ineffective but only applying the question of prejudice as to the latt

¶7 On review, Lawrence reasserts his IAC claim.1 “By entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except those that relate to the validity of [his] plea.” ¶ 18 (App. 2017) (citation modified).

We note, however, that “[b]y entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except those that relate to the 3 STATE v. BRYANT Decision of the Court validity of [his] plea.” ¶ 18 (App. 2017) (citation modified).

¶ 22 (App. 2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2000).

¶ 22 (App. 2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2000).

¶ 22 (App. 2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2000).

¶ 12 (App. 2017); (recognizing statements to court at a change of plea hearing about voluntariness normally bind the defendant).

¶ 22 (App. 2017); ¶ 21 (App. 2000).

¶ 12 (App. 2017) (“Such solemn declarations in open court .

¶ 8 (2017); -28, ¶ 21 (App. 2017).

at 687-88, by offering evidence—not just conclusory statements—that counsel’s conduct fell below prevailing professional standards, -28, ¶ 21 (App. 2017).

¶ 24 (App. 2017) (Relief was denied because “[petitioner] has failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.”).

To ensure that plea agreements remain final, statements made during a plea hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity, and constitute a formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.” ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Richardson’s statements have “legal significance” and “carry a strong presumption of verity.” ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (cleaned up).

Such statements “carry a strong presumption of verity, and constitute a formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.” ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶ 18 (App. 2017) (noting that pleading guilty waives constitutional defects and defenses except those relating to the plea’s validity); (“[A] challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a nonjurisdictional defense.”).

“Such ‘[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity,’ and ‘constitute a formidable barrier’ in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.” ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977)).