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¶9 A mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003).

¶ 72 (2009) (“Mistrial is the ‘most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” ( ¶ 43 (2003))).

We presume that juries follow curative instructions, ¶ 48 (2003), and limiting instructions, ¶¶ 7–9 (2003).

401; ¶ 36 (2003) (A court does not abuse its discretion by finding evidence irrelevant because it did not create a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt.).

“A declaration of a mistrial [] is ‘the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” ¶ 43 (2003) (citation omitted).

¶ 9 (2003); ¶ 48 (2003).

And because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the impact of a witness’s statements on the jury, “[w]e will not overturn [the] trial judge’s decision to deny a motion for mistrial unless we find an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 43, supplemented

7 STATE v. FOSTER Opinion of the Court harmless error analysis.” ¶ 18, supplemented

Mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should only be granted when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003) (citation omitted).

State v. Dann (“Dann I”), ¶ 46 (2003).

did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” ()).

We presume juries follow curative instructions, ¶ 48 (2003).

To warrant reversal, Osborne “bears the burden of showing first that the missed proceeding was of the type he has a constitutional right to attend and, second, that his absence deprived him of a substantial right to defend himself and resulted in actual prejudice.” ¶ 56 (2003).

P. 9.1; –72, ¶¶ 53–54 (2003) (a defendant’s absence is presumptively voluntary when she had personal notice of: the time of the proceeding, her right to be present at the proceeding, and a warning that the proceeding would go forward in her absence).

See U.S. Const. Amendment six; Ariz. Const. art. 2 §§ 4, 24; –72, ¶¶ 52-53 (2003) (discussing extent of Sixth Amendment right to be present).

Even assuming the evidence met the low threshold for relevance, ¶ 51 (2007), the court could have found its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, ¶¶ 35-36 (2003) (affirming the preclusion of third-party culpability evidence when its "tenuous and speculative nature .

Generally speaking, parties are free to waive any number of rights, even constitutional rights such as the right to appeal, –14 (1946), the right to counsel, –23 (1994), the right to a jury trial, –66 (1976), and the right to be present during criminal proceedings, ¶ 54 (2003).

¶17 “Mistrial is the ‘most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” ¶ 72 (2009) ( ¶ 43 (2003)).

¶ 14 (App. 2016) (noting that courts consider the probative value of the evidence "[i]n determining whether evidentiary errors are harmless"); ¶ 18 (2003) (noting that errors are harmless if "no rational jury could find otherwise").

¶ 18 (2003) (explaining litigants are entitled “to a fair trial, not a perfect one” (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (emphasis added))).

is the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” ¶ 43 (2003) (quotation and citation omitted).

¶ 44 (2007) (“An error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”) (cleaned up) ( ¶ 18 (2003)).

Though viewing a prospective juror’s demeanor in-person is useful, see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010), criminal defendants are entitled to a “fair trial, not a perfect one,” ¶ 18 (2003) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)).

¶ 48 (2003) (we presume juries follow curative instructions).