Cited by

¶ 27 (2007) (holding that questions of witness credibility and the weight to give testimony are exclusively for the factfinder).

Evidence is sufficient when “substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.” ¶ 22 (2007).

(“Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence.” (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954))); ¶¶ 22, 27–28 (2007) (noting sufficient evidence of “knowingly” based on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence).

¶ 22 (App. 2020) (holding the appellate court does not “reweigh conflicting evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses”); ¶ 27 (2007) (“[T]he credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.”).

“The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (citation omitted).

Thus, “[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

¶ 27 (2007) (“No rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.”) (citation omitted); see also State v. Valdez, No. 2 CA–CR 2022–0053, 2024 WL 324296, at *2 (Ariz. App. Jan.

When reviewing the evidence, the question is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

We will uphold the conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

See, ¶¶ 27–28 (2007) (defendant possessed a prohibited weapon not used in another crime).

¶ 15 (2007); Allen, 253 Ariz. at 312, ¶ 79.

¶11 “No rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.” ¶ 27 (2007) (-57 (1974)).

“No rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.” ¶ 27 (2007) (quotation omitted).

¶ 27 (2007) ("[T]he credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the [factfinder]."

¶17 While we review claims of insufficient evidence de novo, ¶ 15 (2011), we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," ¶ 22 (2007); ¶ 28 (2017) ("The appellate court does not sit as the 'fourteenth' juror.

This court, however, reviews a claim of insufficient evidence “only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.” ¶ 22 (2007).

Austin, (“Weighing the credibility of witnesses is the province of the jury, not the judge.”) (citation omitted); ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (“[N]o rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.”) ( ¶ 27 (2007)) (emphasis added).

We review the sufficiency of the evidence "only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, 'viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict.'" ¶ 22 (2007) ( ¶ 93 (2006), ).

¶17 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).