Cited by

In considering whether an abuse of discretion occurred, we review de novo whether the trial court properly instructed the jury, and whether the jury instructions properly stated the law

But we review de novo whether a trial court properly instructed the jury, and whether the jury instructions properly stated the law

We review de novo whether the court properly instructed the jury, ¶ 22 (2019), and “whether [the] jury instructions properly state the law,” ¶ 68 (2013).

However, “many psychiatric conditions do not affect a witness’s credibility or his or her ability to observe and communicate.” ¶ 53 (2019).

We review “a trial court’s admission of evidence during the penalty phase for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 87 (2019).

–45, ¶¶ 99–100 (2019) (finding no abuse of discretion because the superior court precluded the remainder of the recording when it stepped “up to the line of unfairly prejudicial”).

¶ 15 (2019) (“[A] mere allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not require appointing substitute counsel.” (citation omitted)).

We review de novo whether a trial court properly instructed the jury, ¶ 22 (2019), and “whether [the] jury instructions properly state the law,” ¶ 68 (2013).

(erroneous admission of evidence which is entirely cumulative constitutes harmless error); ¶ 100 (2019) (“And even if the court abused its discretion in admitting the recording, it was not unduly prejudicial because .

¶ 56 (2020) (aggravator narrowing challenge 25 STATE OF ARIZONA V. DWANDARRIUS JAMAR ROBINSON Opinion of the Court foreclosed by Hidalgo); –97 ¶¶ 171–80 (2020) (same); (James C.) Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 179 ¶¶ 7–8 (same); ¶ 72 (2019) (same); ¶ 121 (2018) (same).

rt’s 32 STATE V. SMITH Opinion of the Court admission of evidence during the penalty phase for abuse of discretion and give “deference to a trial judge’s determination of whether rebuttal evidence offered during the penalty phase is ‘relevant’ within the meaning of the statute.” ¶ 87 (2019) (–57 ¶ 40 (2006)).

¶ 16 (2019) (affirming denial of a change in counsel based in part on the superior court’s finding that “a change in counsel would likely result in the same purported conflict because new counsel might also be unable to visit and confer with [defendant] as often as he would like”).

C. Preclusion of Evidence ¶18 Balli next argues that the superior court denied his constitutional right to present a defense by precluding relevant evidence and limiting his cross-examination of the two grandsons.8 “We review limitations on the scope of cross-examination for [an] abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted).

See, ¶ 60 (2019) (holding the trial court did not commit instructional error when, “without the voluntary intoxication instruction the jury could have rejected [defendant]’s claim of innocence but improperly concluded that his voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the necessary intent for criminal liabilit